The right to obtain patent protection on living material: the causes and consequences of the United States Supreme Court decision in the case of Diamond v. Chakrabarty by Howe, Kevin F.
Retrospective Theses and Dissertations Iowa State University Capstones, Theses andDissertations
2007
The right to obtain patent protection on living
material: the causes and consequences of the
United States Supreme Court decision in the case
of Diamond v. Chakrabarty
Kevin F. Howe
Iowa State University
Follow this and additional works at: https://lib.dr.iastate.edu/rtd
Part of the Law Commons, and the United States History Commons
This Thesis is brought to you for free and open access by the Iowa State University Capstones, Theses and Dissertations at Iowa State University Digital
Repository. It has been accepted for inclusion in Retrospective Theses and Dissertations by an authorized administrator of Iowa State University Digital
Repository. For more information, please contact digirep@iastate.edu.
Recommended Citation
Howe, Kevin F., "The right to obtain patent protection on living material: the causes and consequences of the United States Supreme
Court decision in the case of Diamond v. Chakrabarty" (2007). Retrospective Theses and Dissertations. 15033.
https://lib.dr.iastate.edu/rtd/15033
The right to obtain patent protection on living material: The causes and consequences of the 
United States Supreme Court decision in the case of Diamond v. Chakrabarty 
 
by 
 
Kevin F. Howe 
 
 
 
A thesis submitted to the graduate faculty 
in partial fulfillment of the requirements for the degree of 
MASTER OF ARTS 
 
 
Major: History 
 
Program of Study Committee: 
Christopher M. Curtis, Major Professor 
Amy Bix 
Sara Gregg 
 
Iowa State University 
Ames, Iowa 
2007 
Copyright © Kevin F. Howe, 2007. All rights reserved. 
 
UMI Number: 1446032
1446032
2007
UMI Microform
Copyright
All rights reserved. This microform edition is protected against 
    unauthorized copying under Title 17, United States Code.
ProQuest Information and Learning Company 
300 North Zeeb Road
P.O. Box 1346
     Ann Arbor, MI 48106-1346 
 by ProQuest Information and Learning Company. 
  
ii 
TABLE OF CONTENTS 
 
ABSTRACT ……………………………………………………………………………….iv 
 
CHAPTER 1. OVERVIEW..................................................................................................  1 
1.1 Introduction……………………………………………………………………………. 1 
1.2 Key factors in the Commercialization of Living Material…………………………….. 5 
    1.2.1 The Evolution of Recombinant DNA Technology……………………………….. 6 
    1.2.2 The U.S. Supreme Court decision in Diamond v. Chakrabarty………………….. 7 
    1.2.3 Legislative Action in the Aftermath of Diamond v. Chakrabarty………............... 8 
    1.2.4 Reagan Economic Policy………………………………………………………..... 8   
 
CHAPTER 2. THE UNITED STATES PATENT LAW…………………………………. 10 
2.1 Introduction……………………………………………………………………….…... 10 
2.2 Constitutional Basis……………………………………………………………..…....... 11 
2.3 Patent Rights Under the United States Code………………………………………... ... 13 
    2.3.1 The 1952 Revision of the Patent Law………………………………….................. 14 
    2.3.2 Basic Requirements for Patent Protection……………………………………....... 16 
        2.3.2.1 Section 101: Patentable Subject Matter……………………………………..... 16 
        2.3.2.2 Court Decisions Interpreting Section 101……………………………………. 17 
        2.3.2.3 Section 102: Novelty………………………………………………………… 23 
        2.3.2.4 Section 103: Non-Obviousness………………………………………………. 24 
2.4 Plant Patents…………………………………………………………………………… 26 
    2.4.1 The Plant Patent Act of 1930……………………………………………………... 27 
    2.4.2 The Plant Variety Protection Act of 1970………………………………………... 29 
 
CHAPTER 3. THE EVOLUTION OF RECOMBINANT DNA TECHNOLOGY………. 32 
3.1 Introduction……………………………………………………………………………. 32 
3.2 The Boyer – Cohen Breakthrough………………………………………………...…… 32 
3.3 Impact on the Academic and Commercial Sectors…………………………………….. 34 
3.4 Problems with the Patent Law…………………………………………………………. 37 
 
CHAPTER 4. THE CASE OF DIAMOND V. CHAKRABARTY………………………...... 42 
4.1 Introduction……………………………………………………………………………. 42 
4.2 The case of Application of Bergy……………………………………………………… 43 
    4.2.1 Chakrabarty in the Lower Courts………………………………………………… 52 
    4.2.2 Bergy Remanded………………………………………………………………...... 55 
4.3 The Supreme Court Decision in Diamond v. Chakrabarty……………………………. 61 
4.4 The Impact of Chakrabarty……………………………………………………………. 64  
4.5 Chakrabarty and the Burger Court…………………………………………………….. 67  
 
  
iii 
CHAPTER 5. LEGISLATIVE AND EXECUTIVE ACTION……………………………. 76 
5.1 Introduction……………………………………………………………………………. 76 
5.2 Government Ownership of Patents……………………………………………………. 76 
5.3 The Bayh-Dole Act …………………………………………………………………… 78 
5.4 The Stevenson-Wydler Technology Innovation Act …………………………………. 80 
5.5 Reagan Economic Policy……………………………………………………………… 81 
 
CHAPTER 6. SUMMARY AND DISCUSSION…………………………………………. 85 
BIBLIOGRAPHY…………………………………………………………………………. 89 
ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS…………………………………………………………...…... 94 
  
iv 
 
ABSTRACT 
In 1980, the United States Supreme Court ruled in the case of Diamond v. 
Chakrabarty that living material was in the category of patentable subject matter, provided 
that the living material was a product of human invention as opposed to a product of nature. 
The fact that the material was living or inanimate was held to be irrelevant to the issue of 
eligibility for a patent. This ruling was the centerpiece in a series of events that combined to 
secure the status of animate material as private property. These events fundamentally 
changed the nature of scientific research in the academic community and the relationship 
between the university and the private market. These events also had a chilling effect on the 
pubic debate over the safety, ethics, and morality of commercializing biological material. As 
a result, the citizens of the United States have never fully dealt with this complex ethical 
issue except from a purely economic perspective
  
1 
CHAPTER 1. OVERVIEW 
1.1 Introduction 
This thesis examines events in the late 1970s and early 1980s that combined to 
transition living material from public property to private commercial property eligible for 
patent protection. The circumstances of these events suggest that the social and ethical debate 
over manipulation and ownership of living material was subordinated by the interest, or 
perhaps the urgency, of economic advancement in the global marketplace. The initial 
characterization and ultimate resolution of this issue in economic terms precluded any basic 
value statement or definitive rule of law against which to measure the explosion of progress 
that it unleashed. The door to commercializing living material was cracked open by a margin 
of one vote in the case of Diamond v. Chakrabarty in which a pragmatic, cautious and 
somewhat dysfunctional United States Supreme Court ruled that living material was in the 
category of patentable subject matter, provided that the living material was a product of 
human invention as opposed to a product of nature.1 The fact that the material was living or 
inanimate was held to be irrelevant to the issue of eligibility for a patent. The Court’s 
decision, albeit narrow, was adequate to unleash a stampede of development from which the 
United States has never looked back and with which it has never fully come to terms.  
The United States patent law is a practical economic tool that is nearly as old as the 
nation it helped to build. The ability of the United States’ inventors to secure patents was 
considered critical to compete economically with England. Accordingly, the authority of 
Congress to grant patents was established in the original draft of the United States 
Constitution. Congress wasted no time in exercising this authority. Modeled after the British 
                                                
1 Diamond v. Chakrabarty, 447 U.S. 303 (1980). 
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law, the first patent laws were enacted by Congress in 1790, followed by the original Patent 
Act in 1793.  
The purpose of the patent law was to establish a mutually beneficial process of 
exchange between an inventor and the public. The inventor was offered a temporary right to 
exclude others from using the thing or the process that was the subject of the patent. With 
this power in hand, the inventor could use his invention exclusively or license its use to 
others. In exchange for this exclusive right, the inventor was required to disclose the 
workings of the invention with sufficient detail and clarity to permit others to use it after the 
patent expired. Ideally, once the invention entered the public domain, others would improve 
or expand upon the inventor’s work until they too had something eligible for patent 
protection. Through this cycle, the body of common public knowledge continued to expand.  
The values embodied by this exchange were grounded upon economic principles. The 
criteria for analyzing a patent application were not couched in terms of “good” or “bad.” 
Patent applications were not judged according to moral or ethical principles except in the 
most extreme circumstances.2 Patent laws were couched in practical terms that focused on 
operability, novelty, and utility. The patent law was designed to assure that an invention was 
something new and useful. It did not comment on the wisdom of the invention however. How 
the invention actually performed and its value was determined between the inventor and the 
marketplace.  
                                                
2 A patent can be withheld for reasons of national security. U.S. Code 35 (2000) § 181. In addition, the United 
States Court of Customs and Patent Appeals has ruled that, although safety is not an explicit criteria for 
patentability, it is nevertheless a factor in the broader question of whether an invention is useful. For example, a 
patent would not be granted for a material that is lethal under all conditions of its intended use of treating 
human disease. Application of Anthony, 414 F.2d 1383 (C.C.P.A. 1969). 
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This framework does not mean that the patent doors were flung wide for every person 
who was first in line with something new and useful. The patent law contained basic limits to 
its scope, the primary one being that all inventions must fall within the category of patentable 
subject matter. As this standard suggests, there were certain things not eligible for patent 
protection, primarily things that existed in nature. Inventions necessarily owed their existence 
to human agency. Natural products could be discovered and applied to wonderful new uses, 
but they could not be invented. As such, they were already in the public domain and did not 
need to be “purchased” through the patent law.  
Although products of nature could not be invented, they could certainly be improved 
upon through human ingenuity. Inventors routinely experimented with natural materials and 
their efforts often yielded new and useful products, particularly where they were able to 
isolate and purify them to the point where the end product was not naturally occurring. The 
patent laws were not originally drafted and have never been amended to specifically address 
isolation and purification of natural materials. Over time, however, these standards developed 
through judicial interpretations of the meaning and intentions behind the broad and general 
language of the patent laws. For example, vitamin B12 can be found in nature in impure trace 
amounts. In 1958, the Fourth Circuit Court of Appeals upheld a patent for pure, human-made 
B12 because it satisfied the patent criteria of being new and useful.3 These standards were re-
evaluated constantly by the courts as science advanced and new products were brought 
forward. Critically, the test was always one of economic benefit. Did the patent applicant 
present something new and useful that was not already in the public domain? The standards 
                                                
3 Merck v. Olin Mathieson Chemical Corporation, 253 F.2d 156 (4th Cir 1958). Discussed further in Section 
2.3.2.2. 
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worked efficiently throughout much of the patent law’s history. Interpretations of the law 
remained relatively consistent throughout the nineteenth and early twentieth centuries. 
Profound scientific changes in the second half of the twentieth century created significant 
shortcomings in the jurisprudence however.  
In the late 1970s and early 1980s the simple, serviceable assumptions that girded the 
patent law ran up against two freight trains of discovery. On one track was the train of 
scientific research that had advanced to the point of manipulating living material at the 
genetic level. The ability to splice genes made laboratory creation of new biological material 
possible. This quantum leap in science presented a new and complex set of issues for the 
patent law and the courts. This new technology could be used to copy and create entirely new 
human and animal genes. The second train was one of economic potential. Recombinant 
DNA technology offered hope for curing diseases previously thought incurable. The potential 
profits were nearly incalculable.  
In tandem, these two trains represented a scientific breakthrough on the same level as 
atomic fusion and one of the greatest potential economic booms to the United States since 
industrialization. Realization of this potential did not come cheap. Genetic research 
demanded staggering amounts of time, resources, and money. Those who invested this time 
and money needed some assurance that they would be able to protect their work and recoup 
their investment. As a result, these trains were bearing down at full speed on the United 
States Patent and Trademark Office (PTO), which was not well equipped to address this new 
technology with the existing law.  
Genetic research raised serious questions about the impact on public health and safety 
from experimenting with bacterial and viral agents. It also raised ethical questions about 
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manipulating human and animal life and, moreover, doing so for profit. The ability to secure 
patents necessarily signaled a key factor in the economic success or failure of this new 
technology. Patent applications for living proteins and microorganisms clearly met the test 
for being new and useful but they also raised serious social questions about the meaning of 
American cultural values.  
1.2 Key Factors in the Commercialization of Living Material 
Genetic technology demanded a re-evaluation of the underlying values and goals 
behind the patent law. That re-evaluation resulted in the United States Supreme Court’s 
decision in Diamond v. Chakrabarty (1980), which held that human invention was the key to 
patent protection regardless of whether the thing invented was animate or inanimate. The 
events leading up to and immediately following that decision combined to solidify genetic 
technology as a viable economic tool. This thesis examines four of these events. The first is 
the development of Recombinant DNA technology by university researchers at Stanford and 
the University of California San Francisco, which made plain the economic potential of 
human-made biological material. The second is the Supreme Court’s decision in Diamond v. 
Chakrabarty, which resolved eight years of debate and uncertainty on whether living 
material was in the category of patentable subject matter in the law. The third is two key 
pieces of legislation enacted by Congress in 1980, shortly after the Supreme Court’s decision 
in Diamond v. Chakrabary. These were the Stevenson-Wydler Technology Innovation Act, 
which enhanced and accelerated the flow of government owned technology to the private 
sector, and the Bayh-Dole Act, which made it easier for universities and small businesses to 
secure patent rights on government-funded research. The fourth is the economic policy of the 
  
6 
Reagan administration that firmly established usefulness and practicality of research as a 
criteria for government funding.  
1.2.1 The Evolution of Recombinant DNA Technology 
 
In 1973, researchers at Stanford University and the University of California San 
Francisco established a procedure to splice and clone DNA. Stanford was well versed in 
technology licensing and aggressively pursued patents in this revolutionary field. Its actions 
heralded a change in the relationship between the academic research community and the 
private sector. As the commercial potential of the new science was realized, university 
researchers specializing in genetic research were hired or contracted by private investors. 
This development had a profound impact on the traditional academic protocols of 
information sharing and peer review. It also opened a floodgate of debate over the safety and 
wisdom of manipulating genetic material. The National Institutes of Health as well as state 
and federal lawmakers began a public dialogue on how the fledgling science should be 
regulated. In 1977, concurrent with the public policy debate, an upstart company called 
Genentech demonstrated the feasibility of using recombinant DNA technology to create 
human proteins in bacteria that were virtually identical to their naturally occurring 
counterparts. This accomplishment focused attention on the commercial potential of mass-
producing valuable human genes. The resulting lobbying effort helped to convince Congress 
that the potential benefits of the new science outweighed the risks. By 1978, all the existing 
proposed bills to regulate recombinant DNA research had died in congress, and the private, 
self-regulatory initiatives were greatly relaxed.4 Some uncertainty remained however about 
                                                
4 Sally Smith Hughes, “Making Dollars out of DNA: The First Major Patent in Biotechnology and the 
Commercialization of Molecular Biology 1974-1980,” Isis, vol. 92, no. 3 (September 2001): 566-68. 
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the commercial potential of recombinant DNA because ownership rights in proteins were not 
vested. The accomplishments of Genentech placed this issue in urgent need of resolution.  
1.2.2 The Supreme Court Decision in Diamond v. Chakrabarty 
 
In June 1980, the United States Supreme Court ruled in the case of Diamond v. 
Chakrabarty that living material was in the category of patentable subject matter, provided 
that the living material was a product of human invention as opposed to a product of nature. 
The fact that the material was living or inanimate was held to be irrelevant to the issue of 
eligibility for a patent. It was a five to four decision. This was the first and only time the 
Supreme Court had commented directly on the issue of living organisms and patentable 
subject matter.5 The Court avoided any general or sweeping statement on the ownership of 
living material and instead issued a narrow and technical ruling. While cautious to the point 
of evasion and disputed by four of the nine justices, the decision in Chakrabarty nevertheless 
evinced a major change in the Supreme Court’s attitude toward both products of nature and 
deference to Congress to address new scientific advancement not contemplated when the law 
was drafted. Following the Chakrabarty decision, the PTO released 114 pending patent 
applications involving biotechnology. It had been holding these applications pending the 
outcome of the Chakrabarty appeal. As a result, biotechnology was firmly established as 
private commercial property. Access to the patent system provided comfort and incentive for 
investors in recombinant DNA technology, turning it from a university-based scientific 
research pursuit to a multi-billion dollar industry. The availability of patent protection 
solidified the marriage of private money and academic expertise in a union where the 
direction of research was dictated by profit and secrecy trumped publication.  
                                                
5 Annotation to Diamond v. Chakrabarty, 65 L. Ed. 1197 at 1202. 
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1.2.3 Legislative Action After Diamond v. Chakrabarty 
In the wake of the Chakrabarty ruling, the Stevenson-Wydler Technology Innovation 
Act (1980) made technology transfer an integral part of the research and development 
responsibilities of federal laboratories and their employees.6 Its goal was to enhance and 
expedite the transfer of government research to the business and academic sectors where it 
could be used, improved upon, and made commercially viable. Similarly, the Bayh-Dole Act 
(1980) gave small businesses and non-profit organizations, including university research 
departments, the right to hold and benefit from patents on inventions created in part through 
federally funded research.7 The Bayh-Dole Act created a significant new incentive for 
universities and small businesses to undertake practical and commercially useful research. As 
a result, private funding of university research rose 93 percent from 1980 to 1984 while 
federal funding for university increased by 31 percent, largely in the area of military defense 
research.8  
1.2.4 Reagan Economic Policy 
In January of 1981, Ronald Reagan was sworn in as President of the United States. 
The Reagan administration was a staunch proponent of private money as a source of research 
funding based on market demand and profitability. Reagan’s economic policy greatly 
accelerated private for-profit development of technology. In 1983, President Reagan 
significantly extended the reach of this new policy by directing the heads of executive 
                                                
6 Pub. L. 96-480, 94 Stat. 2311, codified at U.S. Code 15 (2000) §§ 3701 - 3717. 
 
7 Pub. L. 96-517, 94 Stat. 3018, codified at U.S. Code 35 (2000) §§ 200 - 212. 
 
8 Rebecca S. Eisenberg, “Proprietary Rights and the Norms of Science in Biotechnology Research,” The Yale 
Law Journal, vol. 97, no. 2 (December 1987): 178, n 2.  
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departments and agencies to extend the Bayh-Dole Act to all government contractors, 
including large businesses, so that they too could benefit from patents derived through 
government funded research.9 Reagan’s Executive Memorandum, later ratified by Congress, 
contributed to changing the fundamental role of the university from one of pure public 
knowledge to practical commercial research. The Reagan administration policy also signaled 
the resolution of five decades of tension arising from questions of patenting and 
commercializing living material.    
 
                                                
9 Rebecca S. Eisenberg, “Public Research and Private Development: Patents and Technology Transfer in 
Government-Sponsored Research,” Virginia Law Review, no. 8 (November 1996): 1665. 
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CHAPTER 2. THE UNITED STATES PATENT LAW 
 
2.1 Introduction 
 
This chapter examines the constitutional and statutory history of the United States 
patent law. It focuses on revisions made by the Plant Patent Act of 1930, the Plant Variety 
Protection Act of 1970 and the 1952 patent law revision, which represented the corpus of the 
law when Chakrabarty was decided. It also examines appeals court cases interpreting the 
patent laws. Illuminating this context is necessary in order to place the four key factors into 
their proper historical context.  
A patent is a property right that allows its holder to exclude another party from using 
the thing that is patented.1 As a property right, it may also be assigned or licensed to others. 
The specific right under a granted patent is the right to exclude others from making, using, 
selling, offering to sell, or importing into the United States the patented invention.2 The 
current term of a patent is usually twenty years from the date the application was filed.3 It 
falls to the owner of the patent to enforce its rights. If a violation is alleged, the owner must 
seek an injunction and damages in federal court. The patent enjoys a presumption of validity, 
but the accused infringer may rebut that presumption on multiple grounds.4  
The United States patent law had its origin in English law. The 1624 Statute of 
Monopolies was intended primarily to restrict the crown’s rights in granting exclusive rights, 
                                                
1 David B. Resnik, Owning the Genome: A moral Analysis of DNA Patenting (Albany: State University of New 
York Press, 2004), 2. 
 
2 U.S. Code 35 (2000) § 281.  
 
3 U.S. Code 35 (2000) § 154. 
 
4 Roger E. Schechter and John R. Thomas, Intellectual Property: The Law of Copyrights, Patents and 
Trademarks (St. Paul: Thomson West, 2003), 283. 
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although it permitted letters of patent to true inventors of new manufacture.5 The American 
colonies and, later, the new states followed suit. The Constitutional Convention took up the 
issue, presumably to bring some uniformity to the field.6  
Following the Convention, patent rights were established by federal statute. Authority 
of Congress to enact the statute is derived from a grant of power in the United States 
Constitution. The foundation of the patent law is economic benefit.7 This foundation 
provided no framework to evaluate the concerns premised on natural law and ethics that were 
generated by unsettling advancements in biotechnology however. Such moral arguments 
never found a home in the patent law because they were not the catalysts behind the 
constitutional clause from which the patent law flowed.  
2.2 Constitutional Basis 
 
Among the eighteen specific powers granted to Congress in the United States 
Constitution is the power:  
To promote the Progress of Science and useful Arts, by securing for limited  
Times to Authors and Inventors the exclusive Right to their respective  
Writings and Discoveries.8  
It was intended by the drafters that the clause be read disjunctively. In the late 
eighteenth century, “science” generally referred to knowledge in any field. Thus, science was 
                                                
5 Schechter and Thomas, Intellectual Property: The Law of Copyrights, Patents and Trademarks, 284. 
 
6 Ibid.  
 
7 Li Westerlund, Biotech Patents: Equivalence and Exclusions under European and U.S. Patent Law (New 
York: Kluwer Law International, 2002), 9.  
 
8 U.S. Constitution, art. 1, sec. 8, cl. 8.  
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promoted by securing to authors the rights to their writings while useful arts were promoted 
by securing to inventors the rights to their discoveries.9  
The clause does not mandate any specific action on the part of Congress or, for that 
matter, any action at all. It simply grants Congress the power to legislate at its discretion so 
long as the resulting law is a tool to promote science and the useful arts.10 The foundation of 
this clause is not benevolence or recognition of inventors’ natural rights to their inventions. It 
is economic. The clause is premised on a belief that the best way to promote science and 
useful arts is by expanding the body of public knowledge. This is accomplished by offering 
temporary exclusivity as an incentive to create and share useful information. The United 
States Supreme Court summarized this philosophy succinctly in 1954:  
The economic philosophy behind the clause empowering Congress to grant  
patents and copyrights is the conviction that encouragement of individual  
effort by personal gain is the best way to advance public welfare through the  
talents of authors and inventors in ‘Science and useful Arts.’ Sacrificial days  
devoted to such creative activities deserve rewards commensurate with the  
services rendered.11  
 
                                                
9 Michael S. Greenfield, “Recombinant DNA Technology: A Science Struggling with the Patent Law,” Stanford 
Law Review, no. 5 (May 1992): 1056. 
 
10 Compare, for example, with U.S. Constitution, art. 3, sec. 1, which provides that the president of the United 
States must be a natural born citizen, at least thirty-five years of age and having been a resident of the United 
States for at least fourteen years. Congress would have no power to pass a law permitting a 30-year-old French 
citizen to serve as president. Such a law would be unconstitutional. Congress, however, could pass a law 
specifically providing, for example, that living material is or is not eligible for a patent because that 
discretionary power has been granted to it in the constitution.   
 
11 Mazer v. Stein, 347 U.S. 201, 219 (1954). See also, Brenner v. Manson, 383 U.S. 519, 536 (1966), in which 
the Supreme Court noted that a patent system must be related to the world of commerce rather than the realm of 
philosophy. 
  
13 
Thus, Congress may not enact a law pursuant to this constitutional clause premised on 
a moral or ethical desire that authors and inventors own the results of their hard labor. The 
law must be designed to strike a bargain for the benefit of the public. Protection of authors 
and inventors can be offered, but only as a means to promote the public welfare.12  
2.3 Patent Rights Under the United States Code 
 
Although the objective of the constitutional clause was clear, its guidelines left 
Congress with considerable discretion in crafting a patent law. The requirements and manner 
of review evolved during the first hundred years but the current structure of application, 
claim, and examination was essentially in place by 1870. Congress enacted the first patent 
law in 1790, followed closely by the Patent Act of 1793.13 The 1790 Act called for 
examination of all submitted inventions by an appointed commission in order to verify their 
eligibility for patent protection. The 1793 Act replaced the examination commission with a 
registration system. Examination of applications was re-established in 1836, and this was 
supplemented in 1870 by the obligation of the applicant to submit a detailed claim.14 
 The original Patent Act was authored by Thomas Jefferson, who took a keen interest 
in the inventive process and the need to promote it in a fledgling country while, at the same 
time, protecting against monopolies.15 The drafters of the country’s founding documents 
embraced the concept of private property, but to the ultimate end of the public good as 
reflected in a stable social structure. Jefferson’s patent law likely offered something 
                                                
12 Martinetti v. Maguire, 16 Fed. Cases 920 (C.C. Cal 1867).  
 
13 1 Stat. 109, ch. 7 (1790), cited in Michael S. Greenfield, “Recombinant DNA Technology: A Science 
Struggling with the Patent Law,” Stanford Law Review, no. 5 (May 1992): 1057; Act of Feb 21, 1793, sec. 1, 1 
Stat. 319, cited in Diamond v. Chakrabarty, 447 U.S. 303, 308 (1980). 
 
14 Schechter and Thomas, Intellectual Property: The Law of Copyrights, Patents and Trademarks, 285. 
 
15 Graham v. John Deere Co. 383 US 1, 7 (1966). 
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acceptable to everyone. As a political relativist, Jefferson believed that property rights were a 
social creation reflected in the laws of society and not the laws of nature.16 The creation of a 
property right tied directly to the public good exemplified Jefferson’s philosophy, 
particularly in a new society with a fledgling economy, not to mention a fledgling psyche. 
The law also should have created little conflict with the Federalist view that innovation, 
creativity and ambition were inherently virtuous and consistent with the self-interested 
pursuit of wealth.17 
2.3.1 The 1952 Revision of the Patent Law 
 
The most recent major reorganization of the patent law occurred in 1952 and resulted 
in the statutory language and format on patentability of inventions that was in place when the 
Supreme Court issued its opinion in Diamond v. Chakrabarty.18 Therefore, a threshold 
question is whether the 1952 revision reflects any intention by Congress to make a policy 
statement on the patentability of living material. The legislative history suggests that while 
the 1952 review of the patent statute was quite detailed, Congress had no intention of making 
any substantive changes in the law or establishing a new attitude toward what could or could 
not be patented.  
The primary motivation behind the 1952 Act was to rescue the patent law from a 
growing anti-monopoly sentiment in the courts. By codifying common law standards and 
addressing misuse of patents, Congress hoped to stem the tide of court cases rejecting patent 
                                                
16 Gregory S. Alexander, Commodity and Property: Competing Visions of Property in American Legal Thought 
1776-1970 (Chicago: The University of Chicago Press, 1997), 27. 
 
17 Ibid., 76. 
 
18 Pub. L. 593, 66 Stat. 792 (1952), cited in Greenfield, “Recombinant DNA Technology,” 1057 n 32.  
  
15 
rights.19 Beyond this, it appears that Congress was simply trying to clean up and reorganize a 
statute that had not received such attention for eighty-two years. For example, in a January 
28, 1952 speech given prior to enactment of the revisions, Rep. Joseph R. Bryson, Chair of 
the House Judiciary Subcommittee with jurisdiction over the bill, emphasized that Congress 
had no intention of making substantive changes to the law but was merely trying to simplify 
and clarify its meaning. He went on to note that while the United States Department of 
Justice had expressed fears that the upcoming revision might “. . . open the door to a new era 
of patents and permit the creation of monopolies in some of the fundamental discoveries of 
science. I can assure you that was not our intention.”20 
The bill was introduced in the House of Representatives on May 19, 1952 and passed 
without comment.21 The bill was referred to the Senate and was taken up by the full chamber 
on July 4, 1952. Senator Saltonstall specifically asked if the bill would change the patent law 
in any way or merely codify the present patent laws. He was assured that it would only do the 
latter. The bill was passed without further comment.22 
Therefore, there is nothing in the 1952 revision to suggest that Congress intended to 
establish or change policy with regard to the patentability of living material. This is not 
surprising since technology would not bring the issue into the limelight until the 1970s. 
Nevertheless, the law as revised would be the one against which the new technology would 
eventually be measured. This was not ideal for the courts because biotechnology was not 
                                                
19 Schechter and Thomas, Intellectual Property: The Law of Copyrights, Patents and Trademarks, 285. 
 
20 82nd Cong., 2nd sess., Congressional Record 98, pt. 8 (28 January 1952): A415-A417. 
 
21 82nd Cong., 2nd sess., Congressional Record 98, pt. 4 (28 January 1952): 5455-5463.  
 
22 82nd Cong., 2nd sess., Congressional Record 98, pt. 7 (28 January 1952): 9323.  
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specifically addressed in the patent law. When faced with biotechnology-related patents, the 
courts were called upon to determine what Congress intended when it wrote and amended the 
patent law over the years.  
Interpretation of laws and regulations is a routine function of the judicial branch of 
government. There is an extensive body of appellate opinions on the rules of statutory 
construction. Generally, the courts are obligated to effectuate the legislative intent behind the 
law. If the language of a statute is clear, the court must give it effect and not look elsewhere 
for aids to its interpretation.23 If legislative intent cannot be ascertained from the clear 
language of the statute, the court may look to legislative history, administrative 
interpretations and the language in question in the context of the entire statute.24 This section 
concludes with a review of the statutory language and the basic judicial interpretations that 
were available to the courts when they reviewed the Chakrabarty application.  
2.3.2 Basic Requirements for Patent Protection 
 
The 1952 revision to the patent law established three primary standards of review in 
the section on patentability of inventions. This thesis focuses primarily on the first standard 
in Section 101 of the statute. The intention of Congress, as reflected in the language of 
Section 101, was the primary issue created by the Chakrabarty application.  
2.3.2.1 Section 101: Patentable Subject Matter 
 
 The first standard is Section 101, which establishes the categories of patentable 
subject matter. It states in pertinent part:  
Whoever invents or discovers any new and useful process, machine,  
                                                
23 In re Marriage of Logston, 469 N.E.2d 167 (Illinois 1984).  
 
24 Woodmont Country Club v. Montgomery County, 486 A.2d 218 (C.S.A. Md. 1985). 
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manufacture, or composition of matter, or any new or useful improvement  
thereof, may obtain a patent therefore . . . 25  
This language, authored by Thomas Jefferson, dates back to the original Patent Act of 
1793.26 It establishes two basic requirements. First, the thing presented for patent protection 
must be one of four things: a process, machine, manufacture, or composition of matter. If it 
falls into one of these four categories, it must then be something that is new and useful. If an 
invention cannot meet this threshold test, it cannot be patented regardless of the amount of 
money, effort, logic, or ingenuity that went into its creation. As discussed above, the law 
does not seek to reward effort in and of itself. It seeks to create an incentive for effort but will 
reward it only if there is something to be gained by the public. As will be discussed, this 
section created myriad issues for living material. Could one “manufacture” DNA? If so, was 
it “new”?  
2.3.2.2 Court Decisions Interpreting Section 101 
 
As the courts have interpreted the language currently found in Section 101, some 
basic rules have evolved regarding eligibility for patent protection. For example, one cannot 
patent a scientific or mathematical principle. Such principles fail the Section 101 test. First, 
they are not a process, machine, manufacture, or composition of matter. Second, while quite 
useful, they are not “new” in the sense that they were created by human agency. The value 
judgment underlying this restriction is that certain things simply exist. They cannot be 
invented; they can only be discovered. Therefore, they already reside within the public 
domain. There is no bargain to be struck under the patent law because the public already 
                                                
25 U.S. Code 35 (2000) § 101. 
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“owns” what the inventor is offering. The discovery that the circumference of a circle is pi 
times the radius squared was a groundbreaking achievement but it could not have been 
patented. Similarly, Isaac Newton could not have patented the scientific laws of gravity. 
Newton derived the laws of gravity, but he did not invent them. This may seem a harsh result 
when one contemplates the effort and brilliance needed to derive a basic law of science or 
mathematics, but it is consistent with the economic focus of the patent law.  
This general rule does not, however, ban such principles from all aspects of the patent 
law. In the 1852 case of LeRoy v. Tatham, the United States Supreme Court stated that while 
a scientific principle is a fundamental truth that cannot be patented, that same truth can be 
employed in a patentable process.27 The Court offered an excellent analogy: one could patent 
the invention of a steam engine but could not patent the principle of steam power. The 
invention of a machine to extract, modify, and concentrate the natural agency of steam power 
clearly constitutes a patentable invention. In other words, the inventor did not invent steam 
power. Rather, he discovered the properties of steam power (which had always existed) and 
used this knowledge to invent a machine that was new and useful. The steam engine was a 
process (patentable) to make productive use of the properties of steam power (not 
patentable). The Court went on to state that a patent should not be awarded for the result of a 
process since that would discourage other inventors from obtaining the same result by a 
different means, which is contrary to the policy behind the patent law.28 Thus, if the goal of 
the patent law is to maximize public knowledge, why then should the inventor of the steam 
engine be allowed exclusive license for all uses of steam power or all manner of engines? To 
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do so would discourage another inventor from trying to invent, for example, the internal 
combustion engine or the steam boiler to heat buildings.  
This concept is illustrated in the 1932 case of Guaranty Trust Co. of New York v. 
Union Solvents Corporation, a pioneering patent case in the field of natural product patents 
and microbiology.29 Charles Weizmann was a scientist who discovered a new species of 
bacteria that was previously unknown. He used the bacteria to create a new process for the 
fermentation of starch from potatoes for the production of acetone and butyl alcohol.30 
Producing the materials by fermentation was not remarkable; it had been done before. What 
Weizmann invented was a process to isolate a particular bacteria and then use that bacteria to 
produce commercial quantities of acetone and butyl alcohol.  
In 1916, Weizmann applied for a patent for “improvements in the bacterial 
fermentation of carbohydrates and in bacterial cultures for the same.”31 The patent was 
approved in 1918 but withheld from publication for reasons of national security. The patent 
was awarded in 1919 and licensed by Weizmann to a commercial manufacturer. The lawsuit 
for patent infringement was instigated by Weizmann’s licensee in 1930 when Union Solvents 
Corporation began commercial production of the same materials. Among the numerous 
defenses offered by Union Solvents was the claim that Weizmann had been awarded a patent 
                                                
29 Guaranty Trust Co. of New York v. Union Solvents Corporation, 54 F.2d 400 (D. Del. 1931). Note that this 
was not a United Sates Supreme Court case. It was decided by a federal district court of appeals in Delaware, 
the first level of appeal after the trial court level, and affirmed without comment by the United States Court of 
Appeals for the Third Circuit. 61 F.2d 1041 (3rd Cir 1932). The next appeal would have been to the United 
States Supreme Court, which was not pursued in this case. These cases have precedential value but are not 
binding. There are twelve federal circuit courts of appeal and, prior to 1982, the Court of Customs and Patent 
Appeals. They can issue contrary opinions on the same subject.  
 
30 Acetone was a solvent used in the manufacture of film, gas containers and artificial silk. It was also a key 
component in cordite, an explosive used during World War I. Butyl Alcohol was a solvent used in the 
manufacture of lacquers used in finishing automobiles and furniture. Guaranty Trust v Union Solvents, 401.  
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for something not patentable: the life process of a living organism. The Federal Appeals 
Court for the District of Delaware countered by stating that Weizmann’s patent had not been 
awarded for the new bacteria per se, but rather for the process in which the new bacteria were 
employed, which the Court called “the exercise of inventive genius.”32 The Weizmann 
process allowed for production of commercial quantities of butyl alcohol, which was a good 
substitute for amyl alcohol. At that time, amyl alcohol was obtained as a byproduct in the 
production of spirits, which was threatened by prohibition. Thus, Weizmann discovered a 
bacteria and employed it in a process of his own invention. He was rewarded for the process 
that he invented but not for the bacteria that he discovered.   
Compare the result in Guaranty Trust with the 1948 decision in the case of Funk 
Brothers Seed Company v. Kalo Inoculant Company.33 Both companies in the case were 
involved in the packaging and selling of plant inoculants. The process used by sellers of plant 
inoculants was to select the strongest strains of bacteria that enhanced plant growth and 
health, produce them in a laboratory, and then package them in liquid or powder form for 
sale to the public. The inoculants were highly specialized because specific strains of bacteria 
were useful only for specific plants. Therefore, the inoculants had to be packaged and sold 
separately for each type of plant. It was common knowledge at the time that bacteria of the 
genus Rhizobium enabled plants to take nitrogen from the air, fix it in the plant and convert it 
to organic nitrogenous compounds. There were six species of Rhizobium and each species 
had distinct strains that varied in efficiency. A scientist named Bond discovered that certain 
strains of Rhizobium did not inhibit each other when mixed together. With this knowledge, he 
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was able to combine the strains and market a single product suitable for multiple plants. This 
would have greatly decreased the cost of packaging and marketing plant inoculants. Bond 
applied for and was granted a patent for the new mixed-plant inoculant. When his employer 
sought to enforce the patent against its competitors, the validity of the patent was challenged. 
The United States Supreme Court ruled that Bond’s efforts were not eligible for patent 
protection. Bond had done nothing to the bacteria in question. He had simply discovered their 
respective properties and used this knowledge to mix them together in a way that enhanced 
their commercial value. The Court first noted that a patent could not have been awarded for 
the bacteria, stating that:  
. . . patents cannot issue for the discovery of the phenomena of nature. The  
qualities of these bacteria, like the heat of the sun, electricity, or the qualities  
of metals, are part of the storehouse of knowledge of all men. They are  
manifestations of laws of nature, free to all men and reserved exclusively to  
none. He who discovers a hitherto unknown phenomena of nature has no  
claim to a monopoly of it which the law recognizes. If there is to be invention  
from such a discovery, it must come from the application of the law of nature  
to a new and useful end.34  
In support of its analysis, the Court cited the 1887 decision in the Alexander Graham 
Bell telephone patent case in which the Court noted that electricity was a force of nature 
employed by Bell in his invention.35 If left to itself however, electricity would not do what 
Bell needed for it to do. Bell’s invention was the process to control the force of nature to 
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make it accomplish the purpose needed. In other words, Bell employed a force of nature in a 
new and practical use. Comparing Bell’s achievement to what Bond had done, the Court 
concluded that the mere aggregation of biological species fell short of invention. Bond had 
discovered no new bacteria, had not caused the known bacteria to do anything other than 
what they had always done, and had not improved their function. He had simply made a 
commercial advance in packaging. Unfortunately for Bond, the most impressive part of his 
work, his discovery of the principles of the bacteria, was not within a category of patentable 
subject matter. In the opinion of the Court, Bond had demonstrated skill and insight but not 
invention. 
In addition to being eligible for patent protection within a patentable process, 
products of nature are also eligible for patent protection when they are isolated or purified. 
This is illustrated in the 1958 case of Merck v. Olin Mathieson Chemical Corporation.36 In 
1926, it had been discovered that people suffering from anemia benefited greatly from cattle 
liver, although the medical world was ignorant as to why. There were some liver extracts 
available by 1947 but they were expensive and some patients could not tolerate them. After 
many years of trial and error, scientists succeeded in isolating a useful material for treatment 
of anemia that was identified as a vitamin of the “B” class and given the numeral extension 
of “12” since that was the next number in line. Everyone else had been looking for an anemia 
treatment in liver, but those who ultimately discovered that the answer was vitamin B12 had 
found it in other substances. They applied for patents on the B12 compositions. They did not 
try to patent crystalline B12 in its natural state nor did they seek patents on B12 derived from 
other sources. A lower Federal Court of Appeals denied the patent, holding that what had 
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been produced was a product of nature and that the application lacked evidence of invention. 
The Fourth Circuit Court of Appeals reversed the decision. There was no question that 
vitamin B12 occurred in nature. It could be found in trace amounts in cattle and was also 
produced by certain microorganisms. It had no utility in its naturally occurring state for two 
reasons however. First, not enough B12 was produced in nature to be commercially useful. 
Second, the B12 produced in nature was not pure. The Court ruled that the patent applicants 
had used a new source to create pure vitamin B12 in commercial quantities. The Court ruled 
that this satisfied the Section 101 standard because it was a composition of matter, and it was 
new and useful. The Court further ruled that nothing in Section 101 precluded a patent 
simply because the composition was a product of nature. After all, the Court reasoned, nature 
provided the source material for everything that was patented. 
To summarize, natural products can be used in patentable processes. In addition, a 
patent can be awarded when a naturally occurring product is produced in a way that does not 
occur in nature (i.e. in pure, commercial quantities).37 The issue of patentability of living 
material was far from resolved by these precedent-setting cases, however. Neither the Merck 
nor the Guaranty Trust case was reviewed by the United States Supreme Court and neither 
case tread on the more sacred ground of living material.  
2.3.2.3 Section 102: Novelty 
 
If a patent applicant can produce something that falls within the category of 
patentable subject matter, the next gatekeeper is novelty. Section 102 builds on the “new and 
                                                
37 Another example would be the 1911 patent awarded for purified adrenalin extracted from the adrenal gland 
and thus free of problems found in previously used adrenal gland tissue. The purified adrenaline was found to 
be ‘a new thing commercially and therapeutically.’ Parke-Davis & Co. v. H.K. Mulford Co., 189 F. 95, 103 
(S.D.N.Y. 1911). Patentable novelty may also be found upon superior efficiency, purity and cheapness. Union 
Carbide Co. v. American Carbide Co., 181 F. 104, 106--107 (2nd Cir. 1910).  
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useful” criteria of Section 101 by requiring that an invention must be new, original, and not 
used previously.38 No patent is allowed if the invention was previously known or if the 
inventor fully and definitively communicates it to the public more than one year prior to the 
date of application.39 Note again the rigid nature of the law. The patent right is not presumed. 
The onus is on the inventor to seek it out. The patent opportunity is lost if an inventor fails to 
file an application within one year of public disclosure. 
2.3.2.4 Section 103: Non-Obviousness 
 
The final basic standard is found in Section 103. Even if an invention is in a 
patentable category and is new, useful and novel, it must still represent an advancement that 
is not obvious to someone skilled in the prior art, which refers to the existing body of 
knowledge in a field. This standard prevents someone from taking a patented invention and 
working minor modifications to it and then claiming a new patent. The courts have enforced 
this standard through the development of the Doctrine of Equivalents, which states that a 
patent claim may be expanded beyond its specifications to include inventions that perform 
substantially the same function in substantially the same way with substantially the same 
result.40 In fact, it is not even necessary that the invention already exists. The prior art can 
“anticipate” a patent if all claimed elements of the new patent application are present in the 
prior art. The general rule is that “An invention that would literally infringe if later in time 
anticipates if earlier than the date of the invention.”41  
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39 U.S. Code 35 (2000) § 102(b). See also, Application of Brown, 329 F.2d 1006, 1011 (C.C.P.A. 1964). 
 
40 Interdent Corp. v. United States, 531 F.2d 547, 550 (Ct. Cl. 1976). 
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To use an example, suppose a person invents a plow with a yoke for a beast of burden 
and obtains a patent. Another person subsequently notes that plowing is more efficient if 
done by two animals instead of one. Therefore, he widens the harness frame and combines 
two yokes side-by-side and attempts to patent the double-yoke plow. This second person 
would not be likely to obtain a patent because what he did was obvious. He did not invent a 
plow, nor did he invent a yoke. He simply observed that two yokes could be fixed side-by-
side to accommodate two animals instead of one. All of the elements of the double-yoke 
plow were in the prior art, and the new plow did exactly the same thing as the patented plow. 
Although clever and observant, the double yoke plow inventor has contributed nothing new 
to the body of public knowledge, which is the price for a patent.  
The first United States Supreme Court review of patentability following the 1952 
statutory rewrite did not occur until 1966, and it was a Section 103 case. Graham v. John 
Deere turned on the question of obviousness.42 John Deere brought an infringement suit 
against the inventor of a plow blade spring clamp that allowed the plow blade to bump up 
and over obstructions in the dirt. Deere already had a patent on spring clamps for plows. The 
inventor had taken the Deere clamp and rearranged its position on the plow in order to 
distribute the stress over a larger section of the plow, thus reducing wear. The Supreme Court 
ruled that the mere shifting of the stress points was simply a refinement of the existing art 
and obvious to anyone with ordinary skill in the art. As such it was ruled to not be a new 
invention and not eligible for a patent. The Supreme Court reiterated the harsh reality of the 
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patent law, stating that a patent is not designed to secure any natural right to an invention 
based on hard work or ingenuity. It is an inducement to bring forth new knowledge.43  
In sum, these three gatekeepers demand of the applicant something that is patentable, 
new, useful, and not obvious. An essential part of proving that an invention satisfies these 
three basic standards and making sure that the public gets the benefit of its bargain is Section 
112 of the patent law. This section requires a written description of the invention and the 
manner of making the invention in full, clear, and concise terms such that any person skilled 
in the same art can make and use the same.44 The description requirement captures the 
essence of the patent law. It documents the practical use of the invention and creates a public 
record that allows others to verify and ultimately replicate the invention once the patent has 
expired. It also reflects yet another limitation of the patent law in the area of biotechnology, 
which Congress attempted to address in the area of plant breeding in 1930.  
2.4 Plant Patents 
In order to fully understand the legal dispute over patentability of living material, it is 
necessary to step away from the patent law chapter on patentability of inventions and 
examine the separate chapter on plant patents. The need to harmonize the Section 101 criteria 
on patentability with the specific legislation on plants led to conflicting opinions within the 
judiciary as to the intent of Congress toward living material.  
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2.4.1 The Plant Patent Act of 1930 
Congress enacted the Plant Patent Act of 1930 for the specific purpose of authorizing 
patents on asexually produced plants.45 Asexual production is achieved by budding, grafting, 
rooting clippings, or dividing bulbs.46 In taking this action in 1930, Congress made a specific 
and limited statement on the question of patenting living material. The legislative history 
suggests that this was not the primary motivation behind the action however.  
The Plant Patent Act of 1930 was the brainchild of Paul Stark, who was a principal in 
Stark Brothers Nursery, the largest seed breeder in the country in the early twentieth century. 
Stark was also a friend and business partner of Luther Burbank, a respected horticulturist. 
Burbank died in 1926 and bequeathed to Stark his research farm, which included hundreds of 
new plant varieties that had been developed by Burbank but never marketed. The varieties 
were worth a fortune if Stark could secure exclusive rights to them. In 1929, Stark formed 
and served as president of a lobbying group called the National Committee on Plant Patents. 
From this vantage point, Stark drafted and served as the prime catalyst behind the Plant 
Patent Act of 1930.47 The bill was introduced by Sen. John Townsend, Jr. of Delaware who 
was also the owner of 13,000 acres of apple orchards.48  
In 1930, the United States was struggling under the Great Depression. The country 
was mired in issues of hunger and government relief and these were compounded by the 
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drought of 1930-1931. The bill was generally viewed as a Hoover administration farmer 
relief act. It was thought that the bill would stimulate private investment in plant breeding 
and reduce the need for government assistance in that particular field.49 The bill was an ideal 
vehicle for Hoover who, both as Secretary of Commerce and as President, was adamantly 
opposed to government relief and price controls. He also believed that farming was 
hopelessly inefficient, and farmers badly needed to conduct themselves as businessmen.50 
The committee report on the plant patent act addressed the legal issue of patentability 
of a plant under the patent law scheme by stating that a new plant variety from cultivation, 
being created by human agency, was a “discovery” within the meaning of Art. I, Sec. 8 of the 
Constitution.51 Numerous telegrams of support were read into the record when the bill was 
being debated in Congress.52 This included a telegram from Thomas Edison, who urged 
Congress to “Give plant breeders the same status as mechanical and chemical inventors now 
have through the patent law.”53 Some members of congress expressed doubts about the 
wisdom of allowing a patent on something produced in nature, particularly a plant of a food 
producing variety. The bill was referred to as “remarkable” and a “departure from anything 
we have ever done.”54 Sen. LaGuardia of New York voiced strong objection to the bill. He 
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50 Roger Lambert, “Food from the Public Crib: Agricultural Surpluses and Food Relief Under Herbert Hoover,” 
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seemed to be convinced that the language of the bill permitted seed patents and could prevent 
a farmer from harvesting his own crops if planted with patented seeds.55 Ultimately, 
however, the bill passed on a voice vote, framed primarily as economic stimulus legislation.56  
Key to the debate that would ensue nearly fifty years later was new patent law 
Section 162 established by the Plant Patent Act, which provided that: “No plant patent shall 
be declared invalid for noncompliance with Section 112 of this title if the description is as 
complete as reasonably possible.”57 In other words, Congress was acknowledging the fact 
that a plant breeder could not possibly provide specifications for a plant in the same way that 
an engineer could provide schematics for a steam engine. In 1985, this variation in the 
description requirement, as opposed to a policy statement on the patentability of living 
material, was held to be the primary reason for enactment of the Plant Patent Act.58 Until 
then, the existence of the Plant Patent Act served as the foundation of the dissenting opinions 
in Chakrabarty and related cases.  
2.4.2 The Plant Variety Protection Act of 1970 
The Plant Variety Protection Act of 1970 complemented the Plant Patent Act by 
granting limited nonpatent protection to sexually produced plants.59 An international union 
for the protection of plant varieties was established in 1961. Its standards for intellectual 
property protection on plant varieties became effective in 1968 when they were ratified by 
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the requisite minimum of three states (Germany, the Netherlands, and the U.K.).60 American 
seedsmen responded by urging Congress to amend the Plant Patent Act of 1930 to include 
sexually produced plant varieties. Numerous objections were raised, including the fact that 
crop plants changed genetically from year to year. A plant patented one year would no longer 
fit its patent description after one or two generations.61 The final version of the law was taken 
out of the Patent title of the United States Code and placed in the Agriculture title. It 
mimicked the international standard by setting up a system of seventeen-year protection 
certificates issued through the United States Department of Agriculture.62 
As with the 1930 law, the motivation for the 1970 law appears to have been economic 
relief. During floor debate, Senator Pogue of Texas spoke of a “tremendous blight” affecting 
that year’s corn crop. Plant breeding would alleviate the blight. The proposed bill would 
enable people to “get some research done in a hurry.”63 Senator Kleppe of North Dakota 
stated that the bill would permit public expenditures on applied plant breeding to be diverted 
to other important areas that private industry may not pursue.  
Given the content of the congressional debate, it appears that both of these plant-
related laws were motivated by a desire to address an immediate economic problem. In both 
1930 and 1970 Congress was attempting to create financial incentives for private investment 
to replace government support in the plant breeding industry. Although there was certainly 
some comment in 1930 on the wisdom of granting patents to things that grew in the soil, 
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there does not appear to have been a conscious decision by Congress in either 1930 or 1970 
to take up and resolve the question of patentability of living material. At best, this question 
was tangential and did not form the basis for floor debate.  
Of note, however, is the fact that the 1970 law specifically excludes bacteria from its 
coverage.64 The reason for this is not clear in the legislative history. It could have been 
motivated by court decisions interpreting the 1930 Act and holding that even though bacteria 
were technically categorized as plants, the term “plant” in the 1930 law was intended to be 
understood in lay person’s terms.65 Regardless of the reason, bacteria are excluded from both 
laws - by court decision interpreting the 1930 Act and by statutory language in the 1970 Act. 
This fact would not be lost on the dissenters in Chakrabarty.
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CHAPTER 3. THE EVOLUTION OF RECOMBINANT DNA TECHNOLOGY 
 
3.1 Introduction 
 
The discovery of Recombinant DNA technology created a new set of problems for 
interpreting the patent law as well. Recombinant DNA technology is the controlled joining of 
DNA from different organisms.1 It was popularly known as “gene-splicing” in the 1970s. All 
living entities obey a program encoded in their DNA. Recombinant technology takes 
advantage of this by splicing DNA to obtain a specific section and then “recombining” that 
section of DNA with the DNA in a simple organism such as bacteria or yeast. This allows 
researchers to isolate the desired gene of one species for insertion into the cell of another 
species where it can replicate itself. The result is the ability to mass-produce proteins that are 
active ingredients in drugs.2 For example, one portion of DNA contains the information for 
production of Factor VIII:C, which is a blood-clotting agent. Another contains the 
information for erythropoietin, a regulator of red blood cell production. With recombinant 
DNA technology, researchers could isolate those strands from the DNA and mass-produce 
them in a host organism. For the microbiology community, this represented a breakthrough 
on the same level as nuclear fission.3  
3.2 The Boyer-Cohen Breakthrough 
The recombinant DNA breakthrough came in March of 1973 when Dr. Stanley Cohen 
of Stanford University and Dr. Herbert Boyer of the University of California, San Francisco 
(UCSF), established a simple process to isolate and amplify any gene or DNA sequence and 
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move it with controlled precision.4 Boyer revealed his and Cohen’s work at a conference in 
November 1973. His announcement immediately raised concerns over public safety and also 
started the clock ticking on a one-year deadline to obtain a patent.5  
The National Academy of Science responded to the announcement by forming a 
committee on recombinant DNA safety. In 1974, the committee called for a voluntary 
moratorium on recombinant DNA research until the risks could be assessed and procedural 
guidelines established. A Stanford University biologist chaired the committee. Boyer and 
Cohen supported its conclusions. In fact, they were both signatories to a letter calling for the 
moratorium, although Boyer had already begun to share the recombinant DNA plasmid with 
other researchers if they agreed to follow his self-styled safety precautions.6 
 Following Boyer’s publication of the results, Stanford University hustled to complete 
and file a patent application before the one-year publication deadline tolled in November 
1974, after which time the information would become public property. Stanford had a well-
established technology licensing program and its director was routinely copied on 
announcements relating to faculty research with commercial potential. His suggestion to file 
patents on the Boyer-Cohen research took the scientists, at least temporarily, by surprise. In 
addition to the safety concerns, such an action ran counter to academic traditions of 
information sharing and generous attribution of results. The patent application ultimately 
filed by Stanford University claimed both the recombinant DNA process and the resulting 
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Commercialization of Molecular Biology 1974-1980,” Isis, vol. 92, no. 3 (September 2001): 542. 
 
5 Ibid., 556. 
 
6 Ibid., 554-555.  
  
34 
composition. In other words, Stanford wanted to own both the process and the thing it had 
produced, which was new and living biological material.  
3.3 Impact on the Academic and Commercial Sectors 
At that time, the Boyer-Cohen discovery was a purely academic achievement. There 
was no practical use for the thing they had created. The potential for what the process could 
conceivably create was mind-boggling however. Stanford’s rush to secure a patent 
underscored its view that the academic achievement could quickly move into the practical 
commercial realm. This fact was not lost on the researchers. In 1976, Boyer joined with 
venture capitalist Robert Swanson to form a new company called Genentech, which quickly 
advanced recombinant DNA research to the threshold of economic viability.7  
The entire process was fraught with turf battles, egos, and acrimonious debate over 
the propriety of Stanford’s patent application and Boyer’s business venture. The aggressive 
actions of Stanford and Boyer were treading on sacred ground. Traditionally, patent 
applications in academic biomedicine were suspect on ethical grounds. The scientific 
community was largely founded on the sharing of information for purposes of evaluation, 
validation, and extension of knowledge. Any accomplishment in the field was usually the 
result of extensive collaboration among scientists. New knowledge was critiqued, 
scrutinized, and ultimately owned collectively by the academic scientific community. The 
reward to the scientific researcher was peer recognition and esteem derived via publication. 
Attribution to all contributors was common in published results. The patent application and 
                                                
7 Nicholas Wade, “Gene Splicing Company Wows Wall Street.” Science, vol. 210 no. 4469 (October 31, 1980): 
506. 
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the creation by Boyer and his investors of a for-profit company soon created issues of 
fairness, propriety and professional evaluation.  
Noteworthy among Genentech’s research was its work on recombining the human 
gene containing genetic information for the synthesis of interferon, a natural antiviral protein. 
Touted as an effective tool for battling cancer, interferon’s market value for a mass producer 
was estimated to reach three billion dollars by 1987.8 Genentech successfully cloned the gene 
under a contract with pharmaceutical company Hoffmann-LaRoche.9 There was a dispute 
however over where and how Roche Laboratories, a research lab funded by but considered 
independent from Hoffmann-LaRoche Pharmaceutical Company, obtained the gene that 
Genentech successfully cloned. The University of California claimed that Roche made 
unauthorized use of material developed by two UCSF researchers. The attorney for the 
university claimed that the academic relationship, defined by a free and easy exchange of 
materials, was being subverted for commercial profit by private industry. If that was not 
adequate ammunition for a fight, the disputed genes that UCSF claimed to own were 
extracted from the bone marrow of a cancer patient in 1977.  
The sequence of events in this episode demonstrates the validity of the academic 
tradition. After the cancer patient voluntarily donated his genes, they were then nurtured and 
grown in a test tube at the UCSF medical school, a significant feat in itself. A sample of the 
cell line was sent to a scientist at the National Cancer Institute (NCI) who discovered that the 
cells were producing interferon. Although not a surprising revelation, this was news to the 
UCSF researcher, and he shared it with a colleague who was interested in interferon research. 
                                                
8 Nicholas Wade, “University and Drug Firm Battle Over Billion-Dollar Gene,” Science, 26 September 1980, 
1492-1494. 
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This colleague worked at the Roche Institute of Molecular Biology. The Roche researcher 
contacted the NCI and requested samples from the UCSF cells. The NCI passed the samples 
to the Roche lab after a conversation between the NCI researcher and the UCSF researcher 
that would later be the subject of conflicting interpretations. The Roche lab took the cell line 
and, with Genentech’s help, converted it into a super producer of interferon.  
Until this breakthrough, this type of sharing between researchers had been routine. 
The work done at Roche labs, however, yielded an extremely valuable commercial property. 
At about the same time in January 1980, a company called Biogen had also announced the 
successful cloning of the interferon gene. Although the Roche–Genentech method for cloning 
was far superior to that of Biogen, the announcement increased the value of Biogen and its 
contractor by hundreds of millions of dollars.10  
The primary breach of protocol had occurred when the NCI gave the UCSF cells to a 
third party. There was an unwritten agreement in academia that forbade recipients of 
materials from passing them on to a third party. The NCI thought it had permission from 
UCSF to pass the UCSF cells on to Roche labs and also thought it was giving the cells to a 
non-profit entity. For its part, the Roche lab never specifically asked for permission to clone 
the cells and, having done so, then filed for patents on the clones even though multiple 
parties could claim responsibility for contributing the cells, nurturing them, and discovering 
their properties. The interferon cells played a major role in the value of Genentech’s initial 
public offering, which would come on the heels of the United States Supreme Court’s 
decision in Chakrabarty.11  
                                                
10 Ibid. 
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37 
Despite this blow-up, Genentech continued to work closely with UCSF. The biotech 
start-up shared laboratory space and employees with the university. In one case, there was 
noticeable overlap between Genentech’s development of a growth hormone and published 
results from university staff. In that case, Genentech paid the university three hundred and 
fifty thousand dollars in June 1980 to resolve the matter.12 
The Genentech and related accomplishments also quickly dampened the ethical 
debate over recombinant DNA in favor of great excitement over its commercial possibilities. 
Progress on safety guidelines was rolled back. In 1978, NIH revised it guidelines and eased 
restrictions on experiments. All bills introduced to regulate recombinant DNA technology 
died in one of the largest lobbying campaigns on a technical issue in the history of 
Congress.13 Genentech and its peers were poised to become giants in the emerging field of 
commercial biotechnology. A number of issues remained outstanding however; foremost 
among them was whether a patent applicant could secure rights not only to the recombinant 
DNA process, but also the materials it produced. Here the shortcomings of the patent law 
became increasingly apparent. 
3.4 Problems with the Patent Law 
As discussed in Chapter Two, a patent application must present an invention that is a 
new and useful process, machine, manufacture, or composition of matter. It must be novel 
                                                
12 “Investors Dream of Genes.” Time, 20 October 1980, 72. There is no mention of exactly what the payment 
was intended to represent (damages, costs, royalties, etc). Given the potential market value of a growth 
hormone, it was likely a negotiated settlement to reimburse UCSF for its expenses, possibly reflecting the value 
of UCSFs work relative to the amount if investment yet to be made in order to bring the product to market.   
 
13 Sally Smith Hughes, “Making Dollars out of DNA,” 566-68. This effort cannot be attributed exclusively to 
the private sector. The scientific community was an active participant. While it clearly stood to gain immensely 
from employment / business opportunities in this new commercial field, it was also, no doubt, becoming 
increasingly confident in its ability to use genetic material in a safe and responsible manner.    
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and cannot be obvious when compared with the prior art. It must be described in full, clear 
and concise terms such that any person skilled in the same art can make and use the same. 
Recombinant DNA technology was certainly novel and was not represented in any prior art. 
Cohen and Boyer’s work was made possible by discovery of an enzyme called “restriction 
endonucleases”, which can cut DNA in specific places, and another enzyme called “DNA 
ligases”, which can join pieces of DNA together to make a single longer piece. These 
discoveries led to the invention of the process to create recombinant DNA, by which new 
biological material was created.14 The patent standards clearly prohibited patent protection 
for discovery of the naturally occurring enzymes and just as clearly allowed patent protection 
in the new process. The PTO readily granted process patents for recombinant DNA when 
they were applied for. The thornier issue was the resulting proteins. Were they truly new and 
useful, and could their use be adequately described such that the public received its end of 
the patent bargain?   
The problem was that biotechnology was being judged against standards drafted 
primarily to accommodate mechanical inventions. The patent law is most efficient in the area 
of mechanics, where function precedes structure. For example, an engineer observes a field 
of hay being cut with scythes and bundled by hand. He sees the need for a machine to cut, 
pick up, and bundle the hay for easy transport and storage. He designs a machine that will 
perform the needed functions of cutting, combining, and binding. When the machine is 
ready, he applies for the patent.  
                                                
14 Li Westerlund, Biotech Patents: Equivalence and Exclusions under European and U.S. Patent Law (New 
York: Kluwer Law International, 2002), 8.  
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Biotechnology is counter to this model. The scientist derives a new compound from a 
known compound and then experiments with it in order to discover what practical use it 
might have. In other words, structure precedes function. The scientist has his new invention 
before he knows what it can do. These types of discoveries require much time and resources. 
Manipulation of genetic materials took years and millions of dollars before its potential uses 
were fully understood. This is one reason why most of the research took place at university 
research facilities.15 
The patent law was not well suited to the scientific model. It was founded on 
economic reward for the inventor. If two inventors were working in the same area, the first 
one to file a valid application was granted the patent. Thus, the law encouraged a patent 
application at the earliest stage in the development of the invention. This was fine when the 
item at issue was a hay baler. For the biological researcher however, it meant having to 
secure a patent before the claim was fully understood. It also meant less ability to amend the 
patent application as new information was discovered. Another problem was the Section 112 
claim. How did one describe a new protein in a way that could enable reproduction?  
On top of these procedural problems was the fundamental question of whether the 
protein produced by the recombinant process was truly new. There was no question that the 
process of natural isolation of a desired strand of DNA was very inefficient and could not 
produce a therapeutic amount of the desired protein. The recombinant process solved this 
problem and was therefore eligible for patent protection. The proteins it produced, however, 
were identical to the same proteins that occurred in nature. That, after all, was the objective: 
to mass-produce a valuable protein identical to its naturally occurring counterpart. This 
                                                
15 Ibid., 10.  
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begged the question: Should patent protection be available for a protein that was not in any 
way “new”?  
The purpose of recombinant DNA technology was to create a protein identical to a 
natural protein. The core value embraced by the patent law was to reward something 
completely new. For example, proteins derived from blood plasma and proteins created 
through recombinant technology were identical in composition and, more important, had 
identical blood-clotting characteristics. The recombinant protein did not do anything new, 
nor was it intended to. It was valuable precisely because it was identical. This presented the 
biotechnology industry with a conundrum. It had to argue similarity before the Food and 
Drug Administration, convincing it that recombinant products were identical to their 
naturally occurring counterparts in order to obtain approval for their sale to the public. In 
nearly the same breath, it had to argue dissimilarity before the PTO, convincing it that the 
recombinant protein was something new in order to qualify for a patent. Under the law as it 
was interpreted in the 1970s, the inventor could easily patent a process to produce the 
proteins but could not patent the proteins themselves because they were not new. The Board 
of Patent Appeals complicated matters further when it established a position that living 
material such as microorganisms and proteins were not patentable subject matter under 
Section 101 of the patent law.16   
As long as Genentech had patent protection on the only process for creating 
recombinant proteins, its investment was safe and its profits were assured. Biogen, however, 
had achieved the same result through a different, albeit less efficient, process. As soon as 
someone else could create the same protein through a more efficient method - publication of 
                                                
16 Application of Bergy, 563 F.2d 1031, 1033-34 (C.C.P.A. 1977). 
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the Boyer-Cohen research had certainly laid the groundwork for doing so - Genentech was 
threatened with loss of its most valuable asset.17 Given the time and money required to 
produce recombinant proteins and the fact that the market value lay as much in the proteins 
as the process, the situation was untenable for the marketplace.   
Because of the uncertainty over ownership of the resulting product, Stanford 
University amended its patent application to drop the end product and seek rights only to the 
process.18 Stanford, Genentech, and all of the others with expertise in the science needed a 
fresh reading of the Patent statute in light of this new science. This task fell to the 1980 term 
of the Burger Court. The road leading to its landmark decision would not involve 
recombinant DNA technology. It would begin with an oil spill and a General Electric 
researcher named Ananda Chakrabarty.
                                                
17 Two other options were available to protect the invention: legal trade secrecy and actual secrecy. Actual 
secrecy is as simple as it sounds. Do not let anyone know how you do what you do. This is not ideal for 
machines since they can be reverse engineered. It is exceedingly difficult with microorganisms since they are 
easily stolen and propagate rapidly. Secrecy also frustrates scientific norms of publication. Trade secrecy is a 
state law concept and requires that the owner of the secret maintain and document certain standards of 
confidentiality in order to claim the right. Rebecca S. Eisenberg, “Proprietary Rights and the Norms of Science 
in Biotechnology Research,” Yale Law Journal, vol. 97, no. 2 (December 1987): 190-195. 
 
18 Sally Smith Hughes, “Making Dollars out of DNA,” 563. 
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CHAPTER 4. THE CASE OF DIAMOND V. CHAKRABARTY 
4.1 Introduction 
 
Neither Stanford University nor Genentech would be first to present the question of 
ownership of living material to the United States Supreme Court. That distinction belonged 
to an India-born biochemist employed by the environmental division of General Electric in 
its New York research lab. Ananda Chakrabarty was educated in Calcutta and developed the 
concepts for his work at the University of Illinois, Urbana. He joined General Electric in 
1971 and began doing groundbreaking research in the science of cleaning up oil spills, 
resulting in a patent application that included a claim for a new form of bacteria that 
Chakrabarty had created in the laboratory.1 The resulting case of Diamond v. Chakrabarty 
was argued before the United States Supreme Court on March 17, 1980.2 The original 
application for the Chakrabarty patents had been filed in 1972 and had been wending its way 
through the appeals system for eight years. Although Chakrabarty’s process claims were 
approved, the patent examiner denied the claim for a new microorganism on the grounds that 
it was living material and thus not within any class of patentable subject matter. The resulting 
appeals climbed from the Board of Patent Appeals to the Court of Customs and Patent 
Appeals, where Chakrabarty was the victor. Therefore, when the case ultimately came before 
the United States Supreme Court, it was on appeal by the PTO seeking to reverse the lower 
court ruling in favor of patentability of the new microorganism.  
                                                
1 Sheppard, Nathaniel, Jr. “Developer of a New Life Form: Ananda Mohan Chakrabarty,” The New York Times, 
18 June 1980, 22 (A).  
 
2 Diamond v. Chakrabarty, 447 U.S. 303 (1980). Note: Diamond appears in the case caption by virtue of being 
Director of the United States Patent and Trademark Office at the time.  
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Chakrabarty did not work with recombinant DNA technology. His methodology 
employed cross-breeding and fusing of bacterial strains. It was Stanford University and 
Genentech that were making the recombinant DNA headlines and fanning the fires of 
economic potential. The common denominator for all of these applications however, in 
addition to the process claims, was that they were yielding new and valuable living material. 
As Chakrabarty’s case was moving up the appeal ladder, the United States PTO was 
accumulating a growing stack of patent applications in the field of biotechnology. The PTO 
took the position that product patents should not be issued for any of the mounting 
applications but elected to hold the applications in suspense rather than rejecting them. This 
would allow the filers to preserve their claims and have benefit of their filing dates should the 
Supreme Court hear the case and establish a new precedent in their favor.  
4.2 The Case of Application of Bergy 
The legal history of Chakrabarty actually begins with a companion case, Application 
of Bergy, which was decided by the Court of Customs and Patent Appeals prior to 
Chakrabarty. The cases were eventually combined into one case by the Court of Customs 
and Patent Appeals due to their similar facts and their timing but it was Chakrabarty that was 
appealed to and heard by the United States Supreme Court. Both cases must be reviewed to 
understand the evolution of the law in this area.  
In 1977, Application of Bergy was decided by a five-judge Court of Customs and 
Patent Appeals. 3 It was a three to two decision, presaging the one-vote majority that also 
characterized Chakrabarty. Malcom Bergy and two colleagues developed a new process for 
preparing an antibiotic known as lincomycin by using a newly discovered microorganism 
                                                
3 Application of Bergy, 563 F.2d 1031 (C.C.P.A. 1977). 
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called streptomyces vellosus. This microorganism was found in nature but had been purified 
for use in the new process. Use of this new microorganism allowed Bergy to accomplish two 
new things. First, he was able to prepare lincomycin at temperatures ranging from 18 to 45 
degrees Celsius; second, he was able to prepare licomycin without concomitant production of 
a byproduct, lincomycin B. This new process greatly increased the efficiency of lincomycin 
recovery.4  
Bergy applied for five patents, four on the process for recovering lyncomycin and a 
fifth for the newly discovered microorganism streptomyces vellosus. The fifth application 
was supported by affidavits from three microbiologists at Upjohn Research Laboratory 
stating that streptomyces vellosus did not exist as a biologically pure culture in nature and 
asserting that it had been manufactured.5 The patent examiner approved the four process 
applications but rejected the fifth application based solely on the fact that it was a claim on a 
product of nature and therefore not patentable subject matter under Section 101 of the patent 
law. In support of his decision, the patent examiner cited three appellate decisions: 
Application of Mancy, Guaranty Trust Co. of New York v. Union Solvents Corporation and 
Funk Brothers v. Kalo, Co.6 All three cases contained support for the general rule that a 
                                                
4 Application of Bergy , 1032.  
 
5 Application of Bergy , 1033. Bergy’s affiliations are not made clear in the opinion, nor does the opinion 
explain why an arm of Upjohn, a large pharmaceutical company, was involved. It can be assumed, however, 
that Bergy and Upjohn had some type of legal relationship and mutual economic interest in the research. 
 
6 Application of Mancy, 499 F.2d 1289 (C.C.P.A. 1974); Guaranty Trust Co. of New York v. Union Solvents 
Corporation, 54 F.2d 400; aff’d 61 F.2d 1041 (D. Del. 1932); Funk Brothers v. Kalo, Co., 333 US 127 (1948).  
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naturally occurring bacteria or a property of that bacteria was not eligible for patent 
protection.7  
Mancy was a 1974 case in which a patent application was filed for a process for 
producing the antibiotic daunorubicin through cultivation of a specific strain of the 
microorganism streptomyces bifurcus, which was found in and isolated from a soil sample 
taken in France. Streptomyces bifurcus was a known antibiotic, as was the process for 
producing it via aerobic cultivation of strains of streptomyces. The applicants had simply 
found a brand new strain of the antibiotic to which the same process could be applied. The 
process application was rejected on the basis of obviousness.8 The applicants argued that they 
had found and isolated a novel strain of the microorganism and that it was not at all obvious 
that this strain could be used in the process because most strains did not produce such results. 
In other words, the strain they found and used in their process was not known in the prior art. 
The Court of Customs and Patent Appeals held that the applicant’s process was not prima 
facie obvious.9 One skilled in the art would not find it obvious to do what appellants did with 
the materials they discovered. The Court also noted that the applicant had made no claim on 
the new strain of streptomyces bifurcus but:   
                                                
7 Guaranty Trust and Funk Brothers are both summarized in Section 2.3.2.2 relating to judicial interpretations 
of Section 101 of the patent law. In Guaranty Trust, a naturally occurring but previously unknown bacteria was 
used in a patentable process. In Funk Brothers, the discovery and commercial application of that fact that 
certain bacteria had non-inhibiting properties was ruled not adequate to warrant a patent.  
 
8 Obviousness is the third standard in Section 103 of the patent law, discussed in Section 2.3.2.4.  
 
9 The United States Court of Cusotms and Patent Appeals was originally established in 1909 as a five-judge 
federal court of appeals to help with customs cases. In 1929, its jurisdiction was extended to patent and 
trademark cases. It was abolished in 1982 when its jurisdiction was transferred to the newly created U.S. Court 
of Appeals for the Federal Circuit. United States Government Federal Judiciary History,  
www.fjc.gov/history/home.nsf/page/patent_bdy. 
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“. . . would, we presume (without deciding), be unable to obtain such a claim because 
the strain, while new in the sense that it is not shown by any art of record, is, as we 
understand it, a “product of nature.”10  
Citing the holdings in Application of Mancy, Guaranty Trust, and Funk Brothers, the 
patent examiner reviewing the Bergy application concluded that Bergy’s newly discovered 
microorganism could be employed in a patentable process but could not be the subject of a 
patent because it was a product of nature. Bergy appealed the ruling, claiming that his 
process employed a biologically pure form of the microorganism streptomyces vellosus. 
Bergy conceded that the microorganism existed in nature but claimed that it had to be 
isolated and purified in order for it to be of use in the process for recovering lyncomycin. In 
other words, Bergy claimed that he had “manufactured” the purified form of streptomyces 
vellosus for purposes of Section 101 of the patent law.  
Bergy’s appeal was heard by the Patent and Trademark Office Board of Patent 
Appeals. This is a board within the United States Patent and Trademark Office. It is made up 
of the Director of the PTO, the Commissioner for Trademarks and the administrative patent 
judges within the office who are appointed by the Director.11 Upon written appeal of an 
applicant, the Board reviews adverse decisions of patent examiners.12 The Board of Patent 
Appeals affirmed the examiner’s rejection of Bergy’s fifth application for the new 
microorganism. The Board, however, completely ignored the examiner’s stated basis for 
rejecting the application (that it was for a product of nature.) Instead, the Board ruled that 
                                                
10 Application of Mancy, 1294. 
 
11 U.S. Code 35 (2000) § 6. 
 
12 Ibid. 
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claim five of the Bergy application was for a living organism. The Board also ruled that, 
given the absence of any precedent, a strict construction of Section 101 of the patent law 
precluded a patent on a living organism because it was not within the scope of any Section 
101 category.13 Note that the Board of Patent Appeals distinguished between products of 
nature and living things. Products of nature could include inanimate materials such as 
minerals and chemicals that were not living. The Board essentially carved a subset, 
consisting of living things, out of the larger set of products of nature. The Board concluded 
that the subset of living things was not eligible for patent protection under any circumstances. 
Thus, living material was not in any Section 101 category of patentable subject matter.    
It is here that the Plant Patent Act of 1930 became central to the issue of patents on 
living material. In support of its decision, the Board of Patent Appeals cited In re Arzberger, 
a 1940 decision from the Court of Customs and Patent Appeals.14 The Arzberger application 
for a patent on a species of bacteria had been filed under the Plant Patent Act. The applicant 
argued that standards of botany and bacteriology stated that bacteria were properly classified 
as plants. While the Court in Arzberger conceded that this was true, the application was 
nevertheless rejected on the grounds that the Plant Patent Act was not intended by Congress 
to apply to bacteria but only to plants in the layman’s sense of the word. The Court cited the 
legislative history of the Plant Patent Act, which identified asexual reproduction as “grafting, 
budding, cuttings, layering, division, and the like, but not by seed.15  
                                                
13 Application of Bergy, 1033-34.  
 
14 In re Arzberger, 112 F.2d 834 (C.C.P.A. 1940). 
 
15 Ibid, 837.  
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Based on the holding in Arzberger, the Board of Patent Appeals reasoned that the 
Plant Patent Act of 1930 represented the one and only instance where Congress had 
determined to extend patent-type protection to living things. In so doing, Congress had 
clearly limited the extension of this protection to asexually produced plants and nothing else 
and had further defined what it viewed as asexual reproduction. Therefore, the only type of 
patent available to a living thing was a plant patent. Bacteria explicitly did not qualify as a 
plant under the Plant Patent Act. Accordingly, the fifth component of the Bergy application 
was neither sanctioned by Section 101 of the patent law by virtue of being for a living thing 
nor by the Plant Patent Act by virtue of being for a bacteria. In support of its ruling, the 
Board of Patent Appeals noted that Bergy’s argument for an expansive reading of the 
meaning of “manufacture” in Section 101 to include isolated and purified bacteria could 
arguably open up the patent laws to cross-bred animals, such as honeybees, which did not 
occur naturally but were “manufactured” by the breeder. The Court also noted that the 
interpretation urged by Bergy would take plants that were excluded under the Plant Patent 
Act and make them patentable under Section 101, a result that Congress did not intend.  
The PTO and the Board of Patent Appeals had thus made a clear statement on the 
limits of the patent law as it applied to living things. The realm of patentable living things 
was identified, defined and limited by the Plant Patent Act of 1930. If one did not have an 
asexually produced plant, one did not have an option to patent a living thing. The decision of 
the Board of Patent Appeals in Bergy was appealed to the United States Court of Customs 
and Patent Appeals. It was during the appellate arguments that the groundwork was laid for 
the eventual declaration by the United States Supreme Court that living material was in the 
category of patentable subject matter.  
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The Solicitor General, arguing before the Court of Customs and Patent Appeals on 
behalf of the PTO, cited a 1975 case, Application of Merat, relating to a patent application 
for chicken breeding.16 In Merat, the applicant had discovered a dwarfism gene in chickens 
and, through careful breeding, had produced dwarf hens that laid normal sized eggs but 
consumed less food. The applicant applied for patents on the breeding process and on the 
dwarf hens. The patent examiner rejected all claims under Section 101 on the grounds that 
animal breeding was not a process eligible for patent protection and that a thing occurring in 
nature (in this case, a chicken) was not a “manufacture” for purposes of Section 101. The 
Board of Patent Appeals agreed and noted that if animal breeding was recognized as 
patentable under Section 101 of the patent law, then plant breeding would certainly be 
allowed as well and there would have been no need for a specific plant patent statute. The 
Board of Patent Appeals also rejected the application for failure to comply with the Section 
112 claim requirement. The applicant had failed to state with adequate specificity exactly 
what he was claiming as his invention. The Court of Customs and Patent Appeals affirmed 
the rejection based on Section 112 and did not address the Section 101 basis for rejection.  
In considering these facts in connection with the Bergy appeal, the Court of Customs 
and Patent Appeals first noted that the microorganism streptomyces vellosus in the Bergy 
application was clearly not a product of nature because the material was in a biologically 
pure form as a result of human intervention. Therefore, the patent examiner’s rejection based 
on the product of nature exemption was fatally flawed from the start. In fact, the Court of 
Customs and Patent Appeals speculated that the Board of Patent Appeals was well aware of 
                                                
16 Application of Merat, 519 F.2d 1390 (C.C.P.A. 1975). 
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this fatal flaw in the patent examiner’s logic and therefore went looking for a better reason to 
reject the claim, ultimately settling on the “living material” argument.17  
The opinion of the three-judge majority stated that there was clear legal precedent for 
patenting a purified product of nature, which is precisely what Bergy had argued. The Court 
cited two cases for its position: Merck v. Olin Mathieson Chemical Corporation and Parke-
Davis v. Mulford.18 Having established a basis for allowing a patent on purified products of 
nature, the Court saw one remaining issue: Was a purified product of nature, otherwise 
patentable under Section 101 of the patent law, disqualified because it also happened to be 
alive? For three of the five judges, the answer was “No”. The Court appears to have been 
mindful of the warning issued by the Board of Patent Appeals about the potential 
consequences of opening the patent door too wide to living things. The majority took pains to 
note that it was not deciding if living things in general qualified under Section 101 of the 
Patent law, but only whether microorganisms did. Other questions involving living things 
would have to be decided on a case-by case basis. Thus, the Court was clearly not trying to 
establish a broad new policy on living material and, in fact, was consciously avoiding it.  
The majority opinion attempted to address the arguments running contrary to its 
holding. In doing so, it suggested a more expansive reading of previous holdings. The 
majority opinion first noted that it was well established that processes employing living 
organisms were nonetheless eligible for patents. In fact, the PTO examiner had approved 
Bergy’s four process applications utilizing streptomyces vellosus. From this fact, the majority 
                                                
17 Application of Bergy,1035. 
 
18 Merck v. Olin Mathieson Chemical Corporation, 253 F.2d 156 (4th Cir 1958). This case is discussed in 
Section 2.3.2.2. It involved the patent awarded for pure vitamin B-12; Parke-Davis, v. Mulford Co., 189 F. 95 
(SDNY 1911); aff’d 196 F. 496 (2nd. Cir. 1912) was a case permitting a patent on isolated and purified 
adrenaline. 
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opinion concluded that if living material was a permissible component of a process claim, it 
should therefore not be barred from a product claim. This position seemed to expanded long 
held precedent that a new and useful process could be the subject of a patent but that a 
product of nature within that process could not. The Court dismissed fears of patents on 
crossbred animals as “far-fetched” but did not carry the analysis any further than to state that 
the larger issue was not before the Court.19 The Court suggested that microbiology was more 
akin to a chemical reaction than a complex animal. Clearly the Court was attempting to 
discount the fears about crossbred animals by drawing a distinction between bees and 
bacteria. In doing so, however, the Court also opened the door to the possibility of patent 
eligibility based on different levels of life forms. As to the intent of Congress, the Court 
stated that the Plant Patent Act of 1930 was silent on the question of patentability of 
microorganisms and that “the collective mind of Congress was not turned in that direction” 
when it passed the Plant Patent Act.20 This was a paper-thin ruling in terms of the vote (3-2) 
and the substance of the holding.  
The two dissenting judges focused on the intent of Congress as evidenced by the 
structure of the patent law. They reasoned that if Section 101 of the patent law was intended 
by Congress to be broadly construed to allow for patents on living things, then plants would 
be patentable under Section 101, and there never would have been need for Congress to enact 
the Plant Patent Act. By enacting the Plant Patent Act, Congress evidenced an intent to 
extended patent protection for living material only to plants. They cited the legislative history 
of the Plant Patent Act, saying that it was intended to remove discrimination between plant 
                                                
19 Application of Bergy, 1038.  
 
20 Ibid., 1039. 
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developers and industrial inventors. That discrimination was an inability to patent plants. The 
dissenting opinion also challenged the majority’s attempt to equate living organisms with 
chemical compositions such as reactants, reagents and catalysts. The dissent claimed that 
living was fundamentally different from inanimate. In addition, the dissenting justices 
challenged the notion that using a microorganism in a patentable process logically compelled 
that the organism itself was patentable. Ultimately, the dissenting justices concluded that 
whether it was in the public interest to allow patents on microorganisms was a question for 
Congress and not the courts.21 Whether dissenting justices were focused on the public interest 
in terms of economics or ethics or both is not clear. The dissent clearly suggests, however, 
that Congress had been willing to draw some policy lines on the issue during the past fifty 
years and there should be no reason why Congress could not revisit and clarify those lines in 
light of the new science.  
4.2.1 Chakrabarty in the Lower Courts 
 The Chakrabarty case followed closely on the heels of Bergy. It presented the Court 
with nearly identical facts, including a claim for both a new process and a new bacterium. 
Chakrabarty’s area of research was oil spills. Oil spills can be degraded with certain bacteria 
that act to break oil down into simpler components suitable as food for aquatic life. 
Numerous forms of bacteria are required to break down the various components of oil 
however. Unfortunately, the different bacteria strains tended to inhibit each other’s growth 
when mixed together and compromised their efficiency. Ananda Chakrabarty determined that 
the information necessary for degradation of oil was carried in only a part of the bacterial cell 
                                                
21 Application of Bergy, 1041-1042. “We should fill the statutes with judge-made law only under the gravest 
and most impelling circumstances.” 
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- by plasmids in DNA separate from the bacterial cell’s main chromosome. He developed a 
method for removing the specific degradative information from four different bacteria and 
inserting them into a single bacterium. He then combined the new bacterium with a buoyant 
material so that it would float when applied to oil spills. He applied for three patents: one for 
the process to create a single bacterium with the properties of several existing bacteria; a 
second for the resulting new bacterium itself; and a third for the process to mix the bacterium 
with the buoyant carrying material.22  
The Chakrabarty application ran the identical gauntlet as the Bergy application. The 
patent examiner accepted the two process claims but the claim on the new bacterium was 
denied, this time on the grounds that living material was not statutory subject matter under 
Section 101, the examiner having apparently discarded the “product of nature” rationale and 
adopted the reasoning of the Board of Patent Appeals in Bergy. Chakrabarty’s appeal was 
heard by the same Board of Patent Appeals, which upheld the patent examiner’s ruling. This 
decision was appealed to the Court of Customs and Patent Appeals, which followed its 
decision in Bergy by reversing the Board’s opinion by the same three to two vote and holding 
that a new bacterium could be considered a “manufacture” under Section 101.23  
                                                
22 Peter B. Maggs, “New Life for Patents: Chakrabarty and Rohm & Haas Co.,” Supreme Court Review, vol. 
1980 (1980): 58. 
 
23 Application of Chakrabarty, 571 F.2d 40 (C.C.P.A. 1978). Note that the Chakrabarty patent application was 
actually reviewed by the PTO before the Bergy application. However, Chakrabarty requested reconsideration by 
the patent office examiner, while Bergy elected to appeal the patent office decision to the next level, the Board 
of Patent Appeals. Thus, the patent examiner must have ruled on the Chakrabarty application first, presumably 
rejecting the claim for the new bacteria as a product of nature, and then ruled on the Bergy application on the 
same grounds. The Chakrabarty application stayed in the patent office for reconsideration while the Bergy 
application went to the Board of Patent Appeals. By the time the Chakrabarty application came up for 
reconsideration, the Board of Patent Appeals had ruled on the Bergy appeal and established the new criteria that 
living material was ineligible under Section 101. It is likely that the patent examiner was waiting for some 
guidance on the Bergy appeal before reconsidering Chakrabarty. At any rate, when the Chakrabarty application 
was reconsidered, it was rejected on the new grounds. Bergy was first before the Court of Customs and Patent 
Appeals in 1977, followed by Chakrabarty in 1978. The Court of Customs and Patent Appeals elected to 
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The same two judges dissented in the Chakrabarty case, this time offering a more 
refined analysis than in Bergy. The two dissenting judges argued that one could not view a 
thing as both a product of nature and a product of man. They conceded that there was a 
middle ground: a modified product of nature. Such modification did not establish 
patentability until the object’s essential nature was substantially altered however.24 In support 
of their position, they cited the Supreme Court’s 1930 decision in American Fruit Growers, 
Inc. v. Brogdex Co.25 In that case, the patent applicants had discovered that Borax was an 
ideal compound for fighting blue mold on citrus plants, although the reasons for this were not 
entirely understood. Borax was a well known substance and all one had to do was dilute it in 
water and use the water to wash the fruit. The Supreme Court ruled that this was not an 
invention because the fruit was still fruit before and after washing. It was simply better 
protected against disease. The applicant had not invented, isolated or purified the fruit or the 
borax.26  
The dissenting justices in the Chakrabarty Case argued that, in similar fashion, 
Chakrabarty had taken an organism that was suitable for digesting oil and had grafted onto it 
                                                                                                                                                  
combine the two cases into one when the United States Supreme Court remanded Bergy back to the Court of 
Customs and Patent Appeals while the same court still had Chakrabarty on its docket. It issued its new opinion 
on both cases in 1979. Interestingly, Chakrabarty’s petition for reconsideration before the original patent 
examiner put forth a compelling argument that the intention of Congress in passing the Plant Patent Act of 1930 
was to address the fact that plants could not be described in the patent specification required under Section 112 
of the patent law. Chakrabarty argued that the Plant Patent Act represented no expression of any kind by 
Congress on the subject of patentability of living materials. This argument was not addressed or commented on 
in any way but would later form the basis of the holding in Ex Parte Hibberd, 227 USPQ 443 (Bd. Pat. App. 
1985) discussed below. 
 
24 Ibid., 45-47. 
 
25 American Fruit Growers, Inc. v. Brogdex Co., 283 US 1 (1930). 
 
26 See also, Hartranft v. Wiegmann, 121 US 609 (1887). This was not a patent case but it offered the same 
rationale. It held that the application of labor to an article, by hand or mechanism, did not make it a 
manufactured article. Thus, polished seashells were still seashells in the same sense that ginned cotton was still 
cotton.  One did not ‘manufacture’ cotton by ginning it. 
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an extra plasmid, thus making it even better at digesting oil. He had not, however, changed 
the organism’s essential nature. Therefore, the rule established by the Supreme Court in 
American Fruit Growers should apply. Moreover, the dissenting justices cautioned that the 
nature of Chakrabarty’s work with oil spills and its potential for society should not be a 
factor in determining the intent of Congress. It was better left to Congress to determine if 
Chakrabarty’s breakthrough warranted a change in the law.  
As to the argument that the Plant Patent Act was enacted simply to get around the 
description problem in Section 112, the argument made sense only if plants were already 
patentable subject matter under Section 101 but difficult to patent because they were ill-
suited to the description requirement. If the only problem was Section 112, then Congress 
need only have amended Section 112 in order to ease the description requirement where the 
patent application was for a plant. Instead Congress enacted an entirely new law with a new 
description section that conflicted with and indirectly repealed Section 112. If plants were 
already patentable, this legislation reflected poor and illogical drafting.  
4.2.2 Bergy Remanded 
 While the Court of Customs and Patent Appeals was applying its Bergy logic to the 
Chakrabarty facts, the PTO appealed the decision in Bergy to the United States Supreme 
Court. The Supreme Court did not issue an opinion. Instead, it vacated the ruling of the Court 
of Customs and Patent Appeals and remanded the case for further consideration in light of 
the Supreme Court’s recent holding in Parker v. Flook, which had been decided four days 
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before Bergy.27 In light of this directive, the Court of Customs and Patent Appeals voluntarily 
vacated its similar ruling in Chakrabarty and engaged in a new review of both applications.  
 The case that prompted the United States Supreme Court to vacate the Bergy ruling 
was the patent case of Parker v. Flook, decided on June 22, 1978, by a vote of six to three.28 
The Parker case did not present the Supreme Court with a patent application on living 
material but rather a patent on a law of nature in the form of a mathematical formula. In 
Parker, a patent was sought for a unique mathematical formula used in setting alarm limits 
for catalytic converters. A previous Supreme Court case, Gottschalk v. Benson (1972), had 
established the general rule that a unique mathematical formula could only be discovered, not 
patented.29 The difference between Benson and Parker was that Benson had applied for a 
patent on a mathematical formula per se. In Parker, the patent was sought only for a single 
useful application of a mathematical formula. In other words, Benson had sought licensing 
rights to all uses of a formula in all situations, whereas Parker was seeking rights to a formula 
only when used in a process to calculate alarm limits in catalytic converters. Nevertheless, 
the Supreme Court upheld the rule in Benson and affirmed the decision to deny Parker’s 
patent application. The Court held that setting alarm limits for catalytic converters was not 
new or unique and it could be accomplished in other ways. The only thing novel about 
Parker’s new process was the mathematical formula used to achieve the same result and 
mathematical formulas were not patentable subject matter under Section 101 of the patent 
law.  
                                                
27 In re Bergy, 438 U.S. 902 (1978).  
 
28 Parker v. Flook, 437 U.S. 584 (1978). 
 
29 Gottschalk v. Benson, 409 U.S. 63 (1972). 
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Parker had argued that he was not seeking exclusive rights to the mathematical 
formula, but only for a single application of the formula. The Supreme Court found Parker’s 
position to be an argument of form over substance. For example, one could not patent the 
Pythagorean theorem on the grounds that the patent was limited to instances where the 
theorem was used to solve surveying problems.30 The Court conceded that a process was not 
rendered ineligible for a patent simply because it utilized a law of nature or an algorithm. In 
order to obtain a patent, however, the process itself had to be new and useful, not just the 
algorithm within the process. New math formulas were discoveries, but not the kind of 
discovery that public policy sought to protect. In a statement that would later be cited against 
it, the Supreme Court said that it must proceed cautiously when asked to extend patent 
protection to areas not foreseen by Congress when it enacted the law.31  
The three dissenting justices in the Parker case opined that Parker had presented facts 
far different than Benson. The issue in Parker was whether a process patent application lost 
its eligibility because one step in the process was not patentable. The dissenters accused the 
majority of importing a standard of novelty and inventiveness into Section 101 of the patent 
law, which should be concerned only with patentable subject matter. The process claim 
might be defeated on numerous grounds, but Section 101 was not one of them. 
With the Parker opinion freshly in hand, the Court of Customs and Patent Appeals 
combined the Bergy and Chakrabarty applications and undertook a fresh review. Upon 
                                                
30 Parker v. Flook, 590. Interestingly, the Court also expressed concern over the impact of a contrary decision 
on the emerging computer software industry, which relied heavily on mathematics in writing new software. In 
dicta, the court noted that it made no comment on the patentability of computer programming. That was a job 
for Congress. Like the recombinant DNA industry, the computer industry was bursting with economic potential 
and the court was clearly mindful of the possibility of disrupting the new industry. Parker v. Flook, 595. 
 
31 Parker v. Flook, 596.  
  
58 
reconsideration, the Court reached the same conclusion - that a purified product of nature 
otherwise patentable under Section 101 of the patent law was not disqualified from eligibility 
because it was alive - this time on a 4-1 vote.32 In its new opinion, the Court of Customs and 
Patent Appeals indicated that it would wipe the slate clean and start over with its analysis. 
The result was an excellent tutorial on the application of the United States patent law.  
First, the Court noted that there were no standards for patentability in the United 
States Constitution, but simply authorization for Congress to act if it so desired. Second, the 
major revision of the Patent Act in 1952 organized the criteria for patentability into three 
sections: (a) Section 101–patentable subject matter: (b) Section 102–novelty (so as not to 
take from the public something it already owns); and (c) Section 103–non-obviousness (so as 
not to take from the public something it could potentially enjoy through application of 
knowledge it already had). 
The Court characterized this structure as three doors through which an applicant had 
to pass in order to obtain a patent. To get through the first door, one had to have a process, 
machine, manufacture, composition of matter or some improvement thereon. To get through 
the second door, it had to be something new. To get through the third door, it had to be non-
obvious when compared to the prior art.  
The Court of Customs and Patent Appeals expressed some frustration at the United 
States Supreme Court for confusing the three sections in its analysis in Parker. Unlike 
Sections 102 and 103, Section 101 was not a standard. It was simply a list of eligible 
categories of things that a person could try to patent if he could comply with the conditions 
                                                
32 Application of Bergy: Application of Chakrabarty, 596 F.2d 952 (C.C.P.A.  1979). 
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for patentability in Sections 102 and 103. The Court of Customs and Patent Appeals feared 
that the United States Supreme Court, as well as the parties filing appellate briefs, had used 
language and precedent relating to patentability when examining issues of eligibility. 33  
Referring to the Bergy application, the Court stated that the nature of the patent law 
was to stimulate the creation of new technologies. Therefore, one should not argue that living 
material was per se excluded under Section 101 simply because Congress did not 
contemplate it when the statutory language was drafted. The goal of the patent law was to 
encourage the creation of new things that no one previously contemplated. The fact that no 
one had contemplated them is what made them patentable in the first place. Therefore, if 
Bergy had invented something truly new and useful, he should not be denied a patent simply 
because the thing he invented happened to be alive.  
The Court noted that the Section 101 phrase “any new” had been in the statute since 
its inception in 1793.34 The Court then observed that the list of things that never would have 
been contemplated by Congress in 1793 was nearly endless. In Bergy and Chakrabarty, the 
thing being contemplated was molecular biology.35 The Court offered no comment on 
whether living material could pass the tests set out in Section 102 or 103 of the patent law. 
Thus the case before the Court was decidedly not about patentability of living material, but 
                                                
33 Application of Bergy: Application of Chakrabarty, 959. The Court of Customs and Patent Appeals, apparently 
felt some frustration at the higher court’s pronouncements, stating: “ . . . we find in Flook an unfortunate and 
apparently unconscious, though clear, commingling of distinct statutory provisions which are conceptually 
unrelated.”  
 
34 Applications of Bergy and Chakrabarty, 973.  
 
35 Applications of Bergy and Chakrabarty, 974. The court tipped its hand somewhat by citing favorably from 
the amicus brief filed by Genentech, which observed that bacterial organisms are capable of producing human 
hormones, thus opening the door for drugs to treat diseases previously untreatable. This fact alone, while 
relevant to the Section 102 question of novelty, should have been irrelevant to the court’s Section 101 analysis 
of patentable subject matter and yet it was mentioned, as if to justify the court’s action. 
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about whether living material is in a category of things eligible for consideration. Clearly, 
with this reasoning, the Court was framing the conflict between the logical and practical goal 
of the patent law to stimulate new and useful things, and a long standing societal assumption 
that life processes were simply off limits in commercial enterprises.  
As for the Plant Patent Act, the Court concluded that it should not stand as a 
congressional drawing of a strict boundary on the patentability of living things. The Court 
concluded that it was special interest legislation introduced at the behest of plant breeders. 
Moreover, one could not imply the intent of the 1874 Congress that enacted the original 
version of the modern Patent Act, from the actions of the 1930 Congress that enacted the 
Plant Patent Act. The Plant Patent Act dealt specifically with plants and was not intended as 
a position statement on living things. In addition, the motivation behind the Plant Patent Act 
was to spur growth in an agricultural industry that had been badly hurt by the Great 
Depression. It was also to help amateur plant breeders by extending patent protection into a 
non-industrial area. Finally it was enacted to avoid the previous judicial position that plants 
were things of nature and thus not subject to patent protection. The Court also noted that 
Louis Pasteur obtained a patent on yeast in 1873.36  
Judge Baldwin, who had previously dissented, voted with the majority but wrote his 
own concurring opinion. He modified his former dissent based on the Supreme Court’s 
holding in Parker. He stated that Parker established a rule that one could not patent a 
                                                
36 Applications of Bergy and Chakrabarty, 985. The court cited to a 1966 research paper that listed multiple 
instances where the PTO had awarded patents on things such as bacteria, yeast and virus vaccines between 1933 
and 1963. The court concluded that it could hardly be viewed as expanding the patent law in light of the 
existence of those patents. The long and unchallenged existence of these patents could be no more complex than 
a patent examiner who did not appreciate (or perhaps did not agree with) the nuance of living vs. inanimate. 
This, combined with the fact that these patents were apparently never challenged in court, probably allowed 
them to lay dormant over the years. The Supreme Court gave these facts passing mention as well but they did 
not play a significant role in the opinion. Applications of Bergy and Chakrabarty, n. 116.  
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mathematical principle because a mathematical principle was a fundamental truth. The rule 
for Bergy and Chakrabarty should therefore be: What is the basic principle that makes their 
invention valuable and are they trying to preclude others from using that basic principle? He 
concluded that Bergy and Chakrabarty were not seeking to patent a basic principal in nature 
because the things they were using did not occur in nature. Thus, they relied on nature but 
did not try to patent it. The remaining vote, Judge Miller, continued to dissent. He stated that 
if there is a basis for doubt over the intent of Congress, the Court should await a clear signal 
from Congress.  
In sum, the three opinions were disjointed, non-harmonious, and cried out for 
resolution. More importantly, the majority opinion essentially threw down a gauntlet before 
the Supreme Court. Without saying it bluntly, the majority appeared to be questioning 
whether the clear language of a statute should yield to a Judeo-Christian tenant that any life 
function is within the exclusive province of nature or a creator. The opinion of the Court of 
Customs and Patent Appeals challenged the Supreme Court to square the American values of 
economic reward for creativity and sacredness of life. The limits of science and technology 
had allowed these two values to exist in harmony but advancements were bringing them into 
conflict. The Supreme Court ultimately sidestepped the opportunity and elected instead to 
offer a very narrow ruling but one that cracked open the patent door, which was all the 
incentive needed by commercial industry to kick it down.   
4.3 The Supreme Court Decision in Diamond v. Chakrabarty 
Diamond v. Chakrabarty was decided on June 16, 1980. The United States Supreme 
Court settled the issue in the narrowest terms possible and by a five to four margin. The 
majority ruled that a live human-made organism is patentable subject matter under Section 
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101 of the Patent Act. The Court reasoned that the use of the word “any” in Section 101 of 
the patent law was to be given a broad reading - up to and including living material. In fact, 
the majority concluded that the issue presented was not properly captioned as one of living 
vs. inanimate material. Rather, Chakrabarty presented an issue of product of nature vs. 
human invention.37 Accepting the guidance offered by the Court of Customs and Patent 
Appeals, the Supreme Court ruled that a bacterium was in the category of patentable subject 
matter if it was the product of human invention.  
The majority opinion rejected the argument that the Plant Patent Act of 1930 
represented a statement by Congress on the patentability of living material. The Court stated 
that prior to 1930 plants were viewed as products of nature based on Patent Office rulings 
that dated back to 1889 when a claim for fibers found in pine needles was rejected.38 Also 
problematic was the fact that plants were not amenable to the description requirements in 
Section 112. The Plant Patent Act of 1930 was designed to address both of these issues. The 
majority dismissed reference to a 1930 letter from U.S. Secretary of Agriculture, Henry 
Hyde, who stated that the Plant Patent Act was needed because patent laws were at present 
understood to control only inanimate nature.39 Instead, they emphasized the House and 
Senate Committee Reports that said a new plant resulting from breeding was unique, isolated 
and not producable or repeatable by nature.  
The Court declined to examine in detail the treatment of bacteria in the Plant Patent 
Act and the Plant Variety Protection Act. The majority opinion touched on the argument only 
                                                
37 Diamond v. Chakrabarty, 308, 313. 
 
38 Ibid., 311. 
 
39 Ibid., 312. 
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long enough to speculate that Congress was trying to keep bacteria out of the category of 
plants, consistent with the1940 holding in Arzberger that bacteria were not plants for 
purposes of the Plant Patent Act.40 Moreover, the Court stated that the object of the patent 
system was to bring new technology into the public domain and thus have a positive impact 
on both society and the economy “by way of increased employment and better lives for our 
citizens.”41  
The Supreme Court declined to offer any guidance on the larger issue of patenting 
living material. The majority opinion specifically noted that its ruling addressed only the 
question of patentable subject matter in Section 101 of the patent law. As to the other 
gatekeepers in Section 102 and 103 of the patent law (novelty and non-obviousness) the 
Court made no comment. In essence, the Court was directing the PTO to let living material in 
the door to be considered for patentability, but leaving room for the PTO to decide if any 
further roadblocks should be thrown up on the issue. By rejecting the Bergy and Chakrabarty 
applications, the PTO had clearly established a policy that living material was not eligible for 
a patent. The Supreme Court rejected this policy but left the PTO with enough discretion to 
determine if living material could pass the tests set out in Sections 102 or 103.42  
In similar fashion to the majority opinion, the dissenting Supreme Court justices 
followed the logic of the justices who had dissented in the Court of Customs and Patent 
Appeals. Congress had specifically addressed animate invention in the Plant Patent Act of 
                                                
40 The court mentioned in passing that the Patent and Trademark Office had issued patents on claims that 
included microorganisms in 1873, 1967 and 1968 but provided no details or analysis. Ibid., 314, n.9. 
 
41 Ibid., 307.  
 
42 Ibid., n.5. For example, it would have been plausible to decline living material on the grounds that it was not 
novel under Section 102 of the patent law. 
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1930 and the Plant Variety Protection Act of 1970. They drew a very narrow line on the 
subject, having specifically excluded bacteria in 1970. The existence of these two acts clearly 
demonstrated that living organisms were not contemplated as patentable subject matter in 
Section 101 of the patent law. Otherwise, the Plant Patent Act and the Plant Variety 
Protection Act would not have been necessary. The dissenting justices concluded that the 
majority opinion extended Section 101 subject matter to living material while Congress had 
clearly excluded it.43  
4.4 The Impact of Chakrabarty 
Chakrabarty was argued in March 1980 and decided in June 1980. The original 
application had been filed in 1972. In the ensuing eight years, the patent office had been 
ignoring a growing stack of patent applications in the field of biotechnology, pending 
resolution of the issue by Congress or the Courts. In the wake of Chakrabarty, the PTO 
apparently decided not to pursue the issue any further and promptly released one hundred and 
fourteen pending patent applications including the recombinant DNA applications of 
Stanford University and Genentech.44 Congress also declined to step in and moderate the 
Court’s decision. In fact, as will be discussed later, it jumped squarely on the economic 
development bandwagon and passed laws to enhance the impact of Chakrabarty.  
Genentech hailed the Supreme Court decision as assuring the country’s technological 
future. Critics claimed that the Supreme Court had transformed Aldous Huxley’s Brave New 
                                                
43 Ibid., 322. The dissenting opinion should not be interpreted as opposition to patentability of living material 
any more than the majority opinion favored it. The dissenters simply asserted that the decision on such an 
emotional and fundamental issue was more properly made by Congress than the court. Similarly, the majority 
stressed the right of Congress to immediately pass legislation prohibiting patents on living material. Ibid., 318.  
 
44 Harold M. Schmeck, Jr., “U.S. to Process 100 Applications For Patents on Living Organisms,” The New York 
Times, 18 June 1980, 22(A). 
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World from science fiction to reality.45 Commentators were mixed on whether the true value 
of the research lay in the process patents or the product patents. A spokesperson for 
investment banker E. F. Hutton noted that the “sheer psychology” of the assurance of patent 
protection for all phases of genetic research, including the resulting bacteria, would be an 
important step in moving laboratory advances into the commercial arena.46  
On the strength of Chakrabarty, these corporations enjoyed a new standing that 
clearly enhanced their value beyond the precautionary investments of industry giants. 
Genentech responded to Chakrabarty with a public offering on October 14, 1980. The 
founders of Genentech, Robert Swanson and Herbert Boyer, had each put up five hundred 
dollars in seed capital in January 1976. Between its founding and the initial public offering, 
Genentech’s track record was seven hundred thousand dollars in losses and no marketable 
products. Twenty minutes after the markets opened on October 14, 1980, Boyer and Swanson 
had each earned eighty-two million dollars. Genentech stock opened at thirty-five dollars per 
share, hit eighty-nine dollars per share, and closed at seventy-one dollars and twenty five 
cents. At the closing bell, the market value of the company was five hundred twenty-nine 
million dollars.47 Market analysts called the Genentech IPO the most striking price explosion 
in the past ten years. After a week of heavy trading, the stock stabilized at fifty-six dollars 
per share. At its peak, Genentech had a market value of six hundred fifty million dollars, the 
same as Chrysler and about one-third the size of Monsanto. Even when its stock had settled 
                                                
45 Linda Greenhouse, “Science May Patent New Forms of Life, Justices Rule, 5 to 4,” The New York Times, 17 
June 1980, 1(A). 
 
46 Anthony J. Parisi, “Gene Engineering Industry Hails Court Ruling as Spur to Growth,” The New York Times, 
17 June 1980, 16 (D). 
 
47 Nicholas Wade, “Gene Splicing Company Wows Wall Street,” Science, 31 October 31, 1980, 506-507. 
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down to fifty-six dollars per share, Genentech had a larger market value than American 
Airlines.48  
Recombinant DNA emerged as one of the hottest investment fields of the 1980s. 
Venture capitalists scoured campuses for brainpower. The world’s best molecular biologists 
were to be found at university research labs and, by 1980, most of them had ties to private 
companies by 1980.49 Seven companies were working in the field of recombinant DNA at the 
time. The big pharmaceutical and chemical companies expanded their in-house research and 
partnered with or purchased interest in these companies.50 For example, 60 percent of Cetus 
Corporation of Berkeley was owned by Standard Oil and the National Distillers and 
Chemical Corporation. Genentech was half owned by Monsanto, Emerson Electric and 
Lubrizol. Biogen was 16 percent owned by Schering-Plough and 24 percent owned by 
International Nickel.51  
  The upsurge in commercialization also dampened the attention to social, ethical, and 
environmental issues in connection with the new technology. University research in the area 
of biotechnology had a new value. It was transformed almost overnight from an academic 
pursuit to a multi-million dollar industry. These accomplishments, however, were partly the 
result of billions of dollars of public funding dating back to the Public Health Act of 1944.52 
                                                
48 “Spliced Genes Make Splash on Market,” Science News, 25 October 1980, 261. 
 
49 Harold M. Schmeck, “Justices; Ruling Recognizes Gains In the Manipulation of Life Forms,” The New York 
Times, 17 June 1980, 16 (D). 
 
50 Gene Bylinsky, “DNA Can Build Companies, Too,” Fortune, 16 June 1980, 144-154.  
 
51 Parisi, “Gene Engineering Industry Hails Court Ruling,” 16 (D). 
 
52 Susan Walton, “Supreme Court Decision Gives New Life to Old Issues,” BioScience, vol. 30, no. 9, 
(September 1980): 573-575. 
 
  
67 
Chakrabarty and his peers represented the final steps in a long series of developments which 
had been facilitated at tax payer expense. Now the public would be forced to buy the fruits of 
the research it had funded since mid-century. Critics also questioned the public safety of such 
science. For example, the absence of the Chakrabarty microorganism in nature contributed to 
the ability of oil to lubricate moving parts. Was it wise, then, to introduce into nature a 
bacterium that degraded oil’s most useful function? 53  
These issues were drowned in the flurry of economic progress. Five years after 
Chakrabarty, the Court of Patent Appeals held in Ex Parte Hibberd that there was no conflict 
between the Plant Patent Act, the Plant Variety Protection Act and the patent statute.54 Thus, 
a traditional patent could be awarded to a new plant variety. This ruling essentially converted 
the patent law and the plant laws into options with different application requirements and 
different protections. Researchers could choose which route they wanted to take rather than 
be directed a specific route based on the nature of the material. This dramatically expanded 
the commercial use of plants.  
4.5 Chakrabarty and the Burger Court 
United States Supreme Court justices are named by the President, subject to Senate 
approval. Since the justices receive a lifetime appointment, there is no guarantee that a 
President will have the opportunity to name a justice to the Supreme Court. If this 
opportunity presents itself, however, the President can select a jurist whose track record of 
votes and opinions matches the President’s political philosophy. Research shows that ninety 
percent of Supreme Court justices share the political party of the appointing president and 
                                                
53 Ibid., 573-575. 
 
54 Ex Parte Hibberd, 227 USPQ 443 (Bd. Pat. App. 1985). 
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that courts tend to follow the philosophy of the dominant political party.55 Therefore, the 
political philosophy within the Executive Branch of government can be carried over to the 
Judicial Branch when it has the opportunity to make a Supreme Court appointment. This is 
one reason why Supreme Courts and individual justices are often characterized as 
conservative or liberal in their holdings. For example, Democrats dominated both the White 
House and Congress from 1932 to 1968. One hallmark of this era was the United States 
Supreme Court under Chief Justice Earl Warren and its landmark decisions on civil rights 
and personal liberties, particularly school segregation and criminal procedure.56 The 
domination of Democrats in the White House began to wane in the late 1960s however. 
Richard Nixon was elected president in 1968.57 Between the election of Richard Nixon and 
the 1980 decision in Diamond v. Chakrabarty, Republican presidents made five 
appointments to the Supreme Court. President Nixon alone made four appointments in four 
years. This was a key event in redefining the United States Supreme Court and its 
philosophy.58 In the space of thirty months, the political profile of the Court transformed 
from one dominated by six liberal justices to one comprised of three liberal, two moderate 
and four conservative justices.59 
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The make-up of the United States Supreme Court at the time of its 1980 decision in 
Diamond v. Chakrabarty was as follows:60  
NAME  TERM  PARTY APPOINTED BY 
Burger, C.J.  69-86  R  Nixon 
Stewart  58-81  R  Eisenhower 
Blackmun  70-94  R  Nixon 
Rehnquist  72-04  R  Nixon  
Stevens  75-  R  Ford 
Brennan  56-90  D  Eisenhower 
White   62-93  D  Kennedy 
Marshall  67-91  D  Johnson 
Powell   72-87  D  Nixon 
 
The transition of the Supreme Court from a fundamentally liberal to a fundamentally 
conservative body was set in motion when Chief Justice Earl Warren submitted his 
resignation to Lyndon Johnson prior to the 1968 presidential election. The assumption was 
that Johnson would nominate sitting justice Abe Fortas for Chief Justice and then nominate 
another liberal justice to fill Fortas’ vacant seat. Fortas was a close friend and advisor to 
Lyndon Johnson.61 This friendship, combined with the eleventh-hour nature of the 
nomination, subjected Johnson to a barrage of criticism and allegations of cronyism. Fortas 
ultimately withdrew his name from consideration. He was soon under new scrutiny when Life 
magazine reported that he had accepted a twenty thousand dollar annual lifetime retainer 
from a private foundation whose founder was subsequently indicted for SEC violations in 
1966. Fortas resigned his Supreme Court seat under threat of prosecution.62 Thus, instead of 
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inheriting a liberally packed court, incoming President Richard Nixon, who had run against 
the Warren Court nearly as much as he had run against Hubert Humphrey, inherited a 
Supreme Court with two empty seats.63 Nixon filled those seats with Warren Burger 
(replacing Earl Warren in 1969) and Harry Blackmun, a childhood friend of Burger’s 
(replacing Abe Fortas in 1969). Nixon filled two more seats with Lewis Powell (replacing 
Hugo Black in 1972) and William Rehnquist (replacing John Marshall Harlan in 1972).64 The 
trend continued with Gerald Ford, who appointed John Paul Stevens (replacing William O. 
Douglas in 1975).65  
Warren Burger was a lifelong moderate Republican. President Eisenhower nominated 
him for the United States Court of Appeals in 1955.66 His body of work made clear that he 
was an ardent critic of the Warren Court, especially in the area of criminal jurisprudence. 
While Burger proved to be extremely conservative in his opinions on the Court, one essayist 
described him as neither a philosopher nor a deep thinker. His Supreme Court opinions were 
workmanlike, short on constitutional theory and long on fine points required to dispose of 
cases.67  
Legal commentators fully expected that the Burger Court would undo much of what 
the Warren Court had established. This complete overhaul never came to pass however. 
Burger turned out to be a micro-manager who annoyed and offended his colleagues on the 
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bench. The other justices never coalesced under his leadership as the Warren Court justices 
had under Felix Frankfurter and John Marshall Harlan.68 Justices Blackmun and Stevens 
proved to be moderate and independent while Lewis Powell was somewhat unpredictable. As 
a result, there were not five dependable conservative votes on the bench in the Burger era.69 
Out of fifty major rulings in the 1980 term, thirty-four (including Chakrabarty) were decided 
by one vote, compared with nine one-vote majorities in the final term of the Warren Court 
(1968-69).70 The Burger Court was a court of constantly shifting coalitions that offered little 
lasting guidance for courts, legislators or the public.71  
 Many scholars assigned the relative blandness of the Burger Court to the quality of 
its justices. There were four ‘polar’ justices on the Court: Burger and Rehnquist on the right 
and Brennan and Marshall on the left. The remainder of the Court was centrist and 
unpredictable.72 One cannot say that the Court that produced Roe v. Wade was completely 
void of activism but essayists argue that it was a rootless activism. Even Roe v. Wade was an 
exercise in finding a compromise between a woman’s right to avoid an unwanted pregnancy 
and the state’s rights to protect life and health of the mother and the fetus.73 This, ultimately, 
was the legacy of the Burger Court. It consistently avoided legitimizing or discrediting basic 
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ideas.74 It dealt with cases on an ad hoc basis, inspired less by moral vision than by 
pragmatism. Fundamental value choices were more often avoided than made. As result, the 
Burger Court tended to craft practical compromises rather than statements of moral force.75  
This legacy stands in stark contrast to the legacy of the Warren Court, which re-made 
the constitutional law into an evolving entity to the applause of some and the horror of 
others. The Warren Court used its power to get to the “right” decision and was not inclined to 
defer to Congress simply because Congress’ actions could be argued to be reasonable. 
Fundamental fairness trumped the rule of law in the Warren era.76  
Chakrabarty stands as a clear example that the Burger Court did not have the 
personnel, leadership, or cohesiveness to develop and pursue any ideological agenda as to the 
proper place of living material within the patent law.77 Chakrabarty is a careful, narrow and 
practical compromise. The Court takes no stand on the fundamental question of who should 
be allowed to own living material. It does not explore the idea of what it means to be “alive” 
and how this should be woven into the nation’s diverse values and interests. The Court 
simply states that one section of the patent law cannot be a barrier to an application that 
happens to involve biological material. It is a pragmatic decision based on individual facts 
and not on any rigid philosophy. 
It appears that recombinant DNA and similar technologies were both beneficiaries 
and victims of the Burger Court. The argument in favor of patentability presented in 
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Chakrabarty was well suited not only to the Burger Court in general, but to the Burger Court 
as it existed in 1980. The fact that three of the four dissenting justices were alumni of the 
Warren Court suggests that the decision may well have gone against Chakrabarty if the 
Warren Court had heard the case. In addition, although the Burger Court was more than 
willing to test the legality of agency decisions, which were somewhat more hallowed prior to 
1969, it decided few regulation cases that had any effect beyond the specific agency and the 
specific statute at issue.78 There is a longstanding legal theory that agencies are expected to 
be given deference in their interpretation of the statutes under which they operate.79 The 
underlying assumption is that the statutes are technical and the agency that enforces them is 
the most experienced and qualified in interpreting them. Prior to 1984, the Burger Court 
appeared to believe that court interpretation of statutes should prevail over agency 
interpretation. After 1984, the Court ruled that agency interpretations should stand if they 
were reasonable and if Congress had not spoken explicitly on the issue.80 In this sense, 
Chakrabarty was a beneficiary of good timing in that his case came before the Court at a time 
when it was less deferential to agency decisions.  
In addition, the Chakrabarty issues came before a court that valued economic 
practicality. The Warren Court had generally embraced an expansive view of anti-trust 
policy. It believed that the anti-trust laws existed to protect small businesses and to foster 
competition. The Burger Court, by comparison, was disdainful of competitive equality and 
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wedded to the concept of economic efficiency.81 Whereas the Warren Court was inclined to 
label a business practice per se illegal regardless of economic effect, the Burger Court 
embraced a rule-of-reason philosophy that allowed a practice to be defended based on its 
economic impact.82 The Burger Court similarly gave narrow readings to consumer protection 
aspects of the federal securities laws.83 While neither an anti-trust case nor a securities case, 
the Chakrabarty patent and others waiting in line clearly presented massive economic 
potential and Chakrabarty could only have benefited by having his case heard before a court 
that valued economic and business efficiency. This is reflected in the language of the 
decision.84 
Balancing the benefits to the industry was the failure of the Burger Court to make a 
definitive statement regarding a profound issue: the proper place of living matter in 
American economic policy. While the Supreme Court’s ruling in Chakrabarty was a 
watershed event for patent law, the ruling itself was very careful and limited.85  
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The press following the 1980 term of the Supreme Court illustrated the frustration 
and confusion with its seeming timidity. Newsweek complained that the Supreme Court 
contented itself with a piecemeal approach, trying to publish narrow judicial decisions, not 
philosophical tracts.86 There was no guidance on controversial issues.87 Other commentators 
suggested that the Court was simply trying to hide the fact that it was confused on matters of 
constitutional interpretation so it simply avoided them. It replaced broad examination of 
moral standards with narrow agreements based on highly detailed judgments about particular 
situations. When each case seemed to turn on what the justices thought was appropriate for 
that particular fact situation, little that was said by the Court in one decision binds it in the 
next. The Court tried so hard to avoid meddling in people’s affairs that it left the people 
without benchmarks.88 
This is evident in Chakrabarty. Rather than offer a sweeping treatise on the 
patentability of life, the Burger Court simply removed one of several potential impediments 
in the patent law, leaving the others firmly in place. As for those, the Court offered no 
guidance. Nevertheless, the entire patent apparatus was opened up to biological material and 
it readily succumbed to the momentum. Chakrabarty came before the right court at the right 
time and the result tipped the scale just enough for momentum to take over.  
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CHAPTER 5. LEGISLATIVE AND EXECUTIVE ACTION 
 
5.1 Introduction 
 
 Diamond v. Chakrabarty was decided in June of 1980. A few months later, Congress 
would take a significant step to expand the new commercial potential of recombinant DNA 
technology for the university campus, where much of the research was still taking place. In 
doing so, Congress would combine three powerful factors into one economic machine: 
private business, the university research laboratory and public money. The result would be a 
shift from pursuit of pure knowledge with free access to academics to practical research with 
an eye toward marketability.   
5.2 Government Ownership of Patents 
Following World War II, the United States engaged in vast federal funding of 
research. This created an issue of how the government should deal with the government-
owned inventions that resulted from the research. In 1945, President Roosevelt’s National 
Patent Planning Commission recommended that the government make its inventions 
available to anyone for commercial use with the proviso that government agencies have 
authority to grant exclusive licenses as warranted by individual circumstances. As for 
inventions by government funded contractors, the Commission generally recommended 
against full government ownership except where national security was at issue.1 This idea ran 
contrary to the general patent philosophy because it offered the patented item to as many 
entrepreneurs as wanted to develop and market the invention. Depending on the invention, 
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there could be few who wanted to make such an investment if anyone else could enter the 
market with the same product.  
The Attorney General offered a counter position in 1947, recommending that the 
government hold full title to all inventions of government employees and contractors. If 
nonexclusive licensing did not provide enough incentive for the private market, the 
government should finance the development and marketing of government-owned patents 
rather than granting an exclusive license to a private third party.2 This, of course, would have 
resulted in a sort of nationalization of emerging technologies and placed the government in 
the position of a public vendor of goods.  
Presidents Kennedy, Nixon, and Carter all struggled with how to handle 
commercially viable property owned by the government. In 1963, President Kennedy issued 
a memorandum to government agency heads, authorizing them to grant exclusive licenses on 
government-owned patents if they deemed it necessary in order to call forth adequate private 
risk capital to bring an invention to the point of practical application.3 This apparently did not 
result in the shelves being cleared of inventions. A 1968 report advised that utilization of 
government-funded patents was 23.8 percent when the government-funded contractor was 
allowed to hold title to its invention and 13.3 percent when it was not.4 In 1971, President 
Nixon issued a second memorandum that clarified the authority of government agencies to 
grant exclusive licenses and also to revoke previously granted non-exclusive licenses in order 
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to grant exclusive licenses.5 The Nixon memorandum was promulgated into federal 
regulations in 1973. Both Ralph Nader and the Department of Justice challenged the 
regulations on the grounds that there was no legislative authority to support the action. The 
lawsuits were dismissed on procedural grounds, leaving the issue unresolved.6 In 1978, 
President Carter recommended that commercial rights to government-funded research be 
transferred to the private sector through title or exclusive license, subject to retention of a 
non-exclusive license by the government.7 This was close to the ultimate resolution 
embodied in the Bayh-Dole Act. 
5.3 The Bayh-Dole Act  
The Bayh-Dole Act of 1980 was passed on December 12, 1980.8 It gave small 
businesses and nonprofit organizations the right to hold patents on inventions created with 
the help of federally funded research. This created a significant new incentive for universities 
and small businesses to engage in practical and commercially useful research. The Act 
allowed the government contractor, the funding agency and the inventor an opportunity to 
seek patent protection before a government-funded discovery could be given over to the 
public. There was an exception for the greater social good in the statute but only in rare 
cases. Under the law, a small business or nonprofit organization could notify the government 
of its election to retain title to an invention made possible in whole or part with federal 
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funds.9 The federal funding agency was then given a nonexclusive, nontransferable, 
irrevocable, paid up license to practice the invention worldwide.10 Special approvals and 
restrictions were in place to prevent the federal agency from requiring the licensing of the 
invention to third parties.11 The private licensee was required to give strong preference to 
United States manufacturers in granting of licenses.12 As a result, rather than the government 
holding the patent and granting licenses on request, the outside entity held the patent and 
granted one license to the government (which it presumably never used) and another to its 
licensee of choice.  
The sponsors of the Bayh-Dole Act purported to be addressing a problem of 
government inactivity.13 The problem, as expressed by the sponsors, was that the government 
owned the patent rights to twenty-eight thousand inventions that came from publicly funded 
research but did not have funds to develop and market the inventions and would not grant an 
exclusive license to private developers. Thus, only 4 percent of the twenty-eight thousand 
inventions had been successfully marketed. The Act was expressed as being in the best 
tradition of free enterprise.14 Supporters of the law claimed that even after an invention was 
complete, the development and marketing costs posed the same issues and required the same 
incentives. In other words, they were suggesting that the patent process had two distinct 
phases before the public could benefit from the invention. First, the thing had to be invented. 
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Second, and just as critical, the inventor had to have some incentive to invest in post-
invention commercial development. It was in this second phase that the government lacked 
the resources to be effective. As a result, government-owned patents were collecting dust.  
Opponents to the bill argued that the remaining 96 percent of the twenty-eight 
thousand inventions were sitting on the shelf because they were junk, desired by no one in 
the private market place. They argued that if the government owned a patent, it should be 
given to anyone and everyone, and they should then compete. Public taxation for private gain 
was wrong. The Act created an outcry over the public’s right to benefit from the fruits of 
publicly funded research. Why should the public pay twice for the same invention? And did 
the law run contrary to the basic patent philosophy of creating an incentive for inventors and 
investors to fund their own research?15 There were forty co-sponsors and the bill ultimately 
passed on a 91-4 vote.16 
5.4 The Stevenson-Wydler Technology Innovation Act  
The Stevenson-Wydler Technology Innovation Act of 1980 made technology transfer 
an integral part of the research and development responsibilities of federal laboratories and 
their employees.17 It obligated the head of each federal executive department to transfer to 
the newly formed National Technical Information Service unclassified scientific, technical, 
and engineering information from federally funded research for dissemination to the private 
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sector, academia, state and local governments and other federal agencies.18 If the technology 
resulted in a patent, the royalties were to be shared with the federal agency and the individual 
inventor within that agency. This helped to get government created research into the hands of 
academic and private researchers to hopefully improve and extend.  
Working in tandem, these two laws acted to push government funding and 
government created technology out to the private sector and then enhance private sector 
control of the results. These laws did not create the right of private sector patents from 
government-funded research. It simplified and realigned the process. Instead of the 
government controlling the patent and the inventor standing in line for a license along with 
anyone else who had only to request one, the inventor now held the patent and granted one 
license to the government, which, although it held certain “march-in” rights under 
exceptional circumstances, would not likely be a competitor.19  
5.5 Reagan Economic Policy 
In November 1980, Ronald Reagan was elected President of the United States over 
one-term incumbent Jimmy Carter. Reagan destroyed the other Republicans in the primary 
and captured 97 percent of the convention delegate votes. He was never seriously threatened 
after the New Hampshire primary. Gerald Ford withdrew his name from consideration in 
March of 1980, and George H.W. Bush withdrew on May 26.20 Chakrabarty was decided 
three weeks later.  
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Reagan had long coattails in the election as well, as evidence by the change in 
Congress:21 
      Democrats Republicans 
SENATE Pre 1980 Election  59  41  
SENATE Post 1980 Election  48  52 
HOUSE Pre 1980 Election  275  160 
HOUSE Post 1980 Election  242   193 
 
Reagan campaigned on a platform of removing government control from the business 
sector and allowing prosperity to spread via the free market. One of Reagan’s primary goals 
was to restructure the U.S. economy around the private marketplace.22 Advancement in 
technology played a major role in Reagan economic policy. Budget requests for federal 
funding of basic research were well above the rate of inflation for the first three years of the 
Reagan presidency.23 Reagan also freed the research community to select its own projects in 
cooperation with private industry and the demands of the market place.24 Reagan’s 
philosophy was to reduce federal support for science in favor of private money motivated by 
profitability. Under Reagan economic policy, federal money was to be channeled to areas 
that would help make private industry more competitive in the global marketplace. Reagan’s 
science advisor, George Keyworth, made clear that science money was not an entitlement.25 
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It would be given where it could help foster United States leadership in the international 
marketplace. Private sector needs and profit would dictate the application of results.  
The mandates of Reagan Economic policy and the incentives of the Bayh-Dole Act 
combined to shift the academic science community focus from pure knowledge to the bottom 
line. Reagan policy moved academics and industry closer together. Private funding of 
university research rose 93 percent from 1980 to 1984. Federal funding increased 31 percent 
but shifted largely toward defense.26 By 1990, University held patents had increased by over 
ten times their 1980 number, from 150 to 1600.27 Biotechnology professors were in such 
demand that nearly all of them held consulting contracts with private firms. In the fledgling 
industry with few marketable products, one quality of interest to investors was the expertise 
of its scientists and its ability to aggressively pursue patents.28 This new philosophy had a 
chilling effect on the academic spirit of independence and sharing of information. 
Universities had to meet private corporate needs in order to obtain funding. This changed the 
fundamental role of the university from pure knowledge to practical research and created a 
conflict with notions of free exchange of information. This greatly increased secrecy and 
greatly reduced peer review. As a result of these ties, scientists doing basic research were 
hesitant to publish or even discuss their work with peers.29 This ran counter to the traditional 
norms of publication and dedication of results to public use. While patent procedures 
ultimately resulted in detailed public disclosure, the timing was usually far behind normal 
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academic publication. The incentive for recognition was replaced by the mandate of secrecy 
until something patentable could be produced. Thus, the ability to build on prior research was 
delayed by years.30   
In 1983, President Reagan significantly extended the reach of the Bayh-Dole Act by 
directing the heads of executive departments and agencies to extend the more generous title 
provisions given to small business and nonprofits to all government contractors, including 
large businesses, so that they too could own patents on inventions made possible through 
government-funded research.31 
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CHAPTER 6. SUMMARY AND DISCUSSION 
Biotechnology evolved in an era when the United States was struggling to find its 
economic place in a technological world. The new science raised many questions but the 
timing was ideal for a resolution that focused on economic potential. The country was 
coming off of forty years of Democratic dominance in all levels of government. Lyndon 
Johnson had tried to build his great society while fighting a war in Viet Nam. The Warren 
Court had carved out a vast new understanding of the rights of individuals and the power of 
the Supreme Court to pursue an ideological agenda. The tide began to turn in the late 1960s 
when the American middle class began to send a message with its votes that perhaps the 
better focus of individual rights was empowerment of the businessperson and private 
industry. In the decade of the 1970s this ideal became an urgent need as the United States 
was threatened with losing its place in the world market for high technology.  
This new science faced a major roadblock to commercial development in the form of 
the patent laws and the attitude of the United States Patent and Trademark Office toward 
patentability of living material. The patent laws, while not as friendly toward genetics as 
machines, nevertheless embodied a fundamentally economic philosophy: profit in exchange 
for ideas. This issue was placed before a pragmatic and conservative court that valued 
economic practicality and efficiency. Both the patent law and the philosophy of the court that 
interpreted it were geared toward an outcome focused on maximizing the commercial 
potential of biotechnology. At the same time, Congress was moving to maximize the 
economic potential of information owned or controlled by the government by giving 
inventors a much greater stake in their work. Its actions further enhanced the economic 
potential of biotechnology.  
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On the other hand, these actions wedded universities and industries together in a way 
that changed the basic protocols of academic research. Decisions on the subject and type of 
research became focused on what was practical and commercially viable. This was necessary 
in order to obtain funding. The research was done under a veil of secrecy so as to protect the 
commercial rights in the results. The potential benefits of theoretical research and free 
sharing of information were lost in the demand for practical bang from government bucks. 
Also lost were answers to the real but unprofitable needs of smaller and poorer segments of 
society that could not offer the marketplace profits demanded by the costly research.        
In addition, the manner in which the Supreme Court and Congress set these changes 
in motion did not provide or leave room for any thoughtful reflection on the meaning and 
value of life in American society. The Burger Court did not take up the challenge (as the 
Warren Court may well have), and Congress also declined. This is not to suggest that the 
actions of Congress or the decision of the Supreme Court were either sound or unsound, or 
that the commercial explosion they fostered was good or bad. The point made is that neither 
the Court nor Congress seized the opportunity to prod the larger public into reflection and 
debate over its values. The Court offered no food for thought, no value statement, no 
substantive rationale, and no argument starters–nothing to stimulate a process of comment 
and reflection. Chakrabarty demanded a value statement. The public needed to wrestle with 
this issue and come to some conclusions. Commentators and philosophers needed to urge 
them along. The technical and sterile nature of the ruling preempted this exercise on any 
large scale. Science charged forward before the public knew what had hit it. As a result, 
issues that should have been anguished over were simply accepted as the new status quo.  
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Writing for the New York Times the week after the Chakrabarty decision, Harold 
Morowitz, professor of molecular biophysics and biochemistry at Yale, bemoaned the casual 
manner in which the Court had acted on an issue of such gravity. He believed that the nation 
as a whole would have been much better off considering the deep philosophical implications 
of what the Court had done. The Court, in his opinion, had brushed aside thousands of years 
of awe and respect for life that dated to pre-biblical times. He believed that the Court had not 
made a narrow decision on patent law. Rather, it had altered the view of humanity and done 
so in a way that cut off a grand philosophical debate by making it the law of the land that 
living material was for sale.1 As a result, the ethical and philosophical debate was muted and 
did not evolve along with the technology. Twenty-seven years later, we do not know what we 
think about it or even how to think about it. We have simply stood by and allowed it to 
happen.  
Clearly, this cannot all be dumped in the lap of the Burger Court or Congress, but 
equally clear is the fact that this Court and this Congress passed on a unique and timely 
opportunity to take the issue to the streets. The debate went on as an academic and 
theological exercise, but it held no candle to the comparative light speed of science.  
Under no circumstances should this commentary be viewed as condemnation of 
biotechnology or what it has achieved to date. It could very well be that Chakrabarty was the 
best possible result. It could well be that this technology needed an overnight validation lest 
the nation let the opportunity pass while it struggled for years in gridlock. It could ultimately 
be that biotechnology will turn out to be a benevolent master, and the good we have gained 
                                                
1 Harold J. Morowitz, “Reducing Life to Physics,” The New York Times, 23 June 1980, 23 (A). 
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and will continue to gain will make us better. If such turns out to be the case however, the 
positive result will have been purely fortuitous. 
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